JPRS 76112
25 July 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1603

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GENERAL RESIGNS, PROTESTS DEFENSE POSTURE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Jun 80 p 34

[Article by Jussi Otalahti: "A General's Protest"]

[Text] Major Juhani Ruutu resigned from the post of military district commander in protest to the reduced prestige of the Army and to the fact that the lieutenant general's vacancy was given to the Air Force.

Major Juhani Ruutu's protest resignation does not seem to have shaken the defense forces at all, only the large group of people at the farewell ceremonies indicated that a well-liked individual was leaving.

The discussion concerning the prestige of the Army preceding the argument for his resignation has been almost ignored in the officer corps with a shrug of the shoulders: "They are his own opinions, it is not an official stand," or at best "He could have stayed on even out of spite".

However, a little more trouble and attention has been given to the matter in the general staff and the Ministry of Defense. The figures have been dug up, it has been confirmed that the man was on the right path in emphasizing the importance of the Army -- but with the wrong arguments.

Major General Ruutu resigned from the post of Southeast Finland Military District Commander in the beginning of June. He has announced that his resignation is a protest to the declining prestige of his work in the military district and the importance of the Army. The final contributing factor to his resignation was the fact that the lieutenant general's vacancy he was expecting was given to a young commander in the Air Force.

Ruutu announced his forthcoming resignation as well as the nature of his protest to the military units of his area early in the spring. The discussion and position concerning this matter among the officer groups were at that time just as lukewarm as they are now even though the arguments have been made public.

Ruutu assures us that the personality differences are a point of minor importance and his primary concern is for the future of the whole Army. "The cutting edge has over the years been gradually been taken away from the Army in many respects, now the lieutenant general's post has been given to the Air Force, a post which has traditionally belonged to the Southwest Finland Military District since division days or since the early 1950's.

"I consider that the Army makes up that factor which is able to anticipate and take dependable, preventative action with respect to a war. In making basic procurements as well as in appointing official posts we must make certain that the Army is able to execute this task," explains Ruutu.

He says the same thing on a somewhat more personal level when noting that other commanders in the Southwest Finland Military District have been promoted, then why has he not been promoted. Now the post of lieutenant general is in the hands of a young commander in the Air Force.

Merio More Senior as a Major General

According to the general staff the defense establishment has at its disposal a total of nine positions for generals to be divided between seven military district as well as the Navy and the Air Force, of which three are lieutenant major vacancies and six are major general vacancies.

Now "it just so happened" that Rauno Merio, commander of the Air Forces, was more senior than Ruutu as a major general. The position became open when the commander of the Northern Finland Military District retired. Ruutu expected that the position would "return" to the large military district of Southeast Finland.

Ruutu and the general staff are of a different opinion about the lieutenant general traditionain the Southeast Finland Military District. Ruutu states that the commanders of this military district, which is the second largest as far as numbers of units are concerned, have all been lieutenant generals, at least when they have left office.

When Ruutu states that the position has been frequently lent to others temporarily along the way, even to the Air Force, the general staff refers to a tradition of alternating assignments. Those admirable colonels are quick to point out with their pocket calculators that in the 14 years of its existence the military district has been lef for a total of 5 years by a man with the rank of lieutenant general, the remaining 9 years have been under the leadership of a major general awaiting a promotion.

Ruutu himself increased the amount of time under a major general by 3 years and considers the waiting period to be long enough. His predecessor, Erkki Setala "waited" 4 years and led the district as a lieutenant general for 2 years. Ruutu could have continued as commander for 2 more years indeed with his present rank.

Consideration to the Army

The general staff as well as the Ministry of Defense are of the same opinion as Ruutu with respect to the primary importance of the Army as the guarantor of peace. Major General Jorma Valo, chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Ministry of Defense, caused the aspirations which have appeared since the 1960's to crystallize primarily into self-defense.

"It was not so much a matter of promoting the Air Force as it was of preventing its total collapse. The importance of the Army is decisive, but wars are not started until troops are assembled on the borders and air surveillance is absolutely necessary."

Also the two previous parliamentary defense committees have confirmed that an air force capable of functioning is needed in the prevention of war. On this basis the development of the Army has been cut back. Now the third defense committee has been given instructions by the commander of the defense forces that it is now the Army's turn in the 1980's.

Military Experience and Its Appreciation

In addition to the tug of war between the various branches of service, the traditional problems involved in the changeover from one generation to the next crop up in Major General Ruutu's venting of spleen. Ruutu does not consider possible differences of position between military experience and "the boot camp soldier" as significant as the reduction of military unit experience in key places.

"In recent years men who are lacking in military unit experience and a feeling for the whole rank and file have been promoted to leading positions in the general staff and the Ministry of Defense." From out of these concerns comes the example that at this time there is no single general in the general staff who has gained his experience and knowledge from the bow of a military district.

Major General Jorma Valo considers that the passing from one generation to the next is dictated by nature and believes that those generals who have personally experienced warfare will no longer be on active duty by the year 1983.

On the other hand, he has observed that in practice military district commander positions have represented the final step before retirement.

According to Valo military unit experience cannot be required for the whole body of generals since we do not have a sufficient number of units. On the other hand, Valo who has not had unit experience himself considers that there are areas in which the needed knowledge cannot be gained from unit experience. This has come up frequently in connection with appointments.

An Important Military District

Major General Ruutu states that he has given up a spot which he perceived to be his goal in life. "I would have willingly continued for 2 more years, but I had already served for 3 years as a major general in the duties of a lieutenant general and considered this to be a long enough time to wait," state. Ruutu.

The Southeast Finland Military District is one of the nation's seven military districts and encompasses the provinces of Mikkeli and Kymi. As far as the

number of units is concerned it is the country's second largest military district after the South Finland Military District. The North Finland Military District is the second largest as far as personnel strength is concerned.

The commander of this military district as well as his staff, which are directly under the command of the defense forces, are located in Kouvola just as was the staff of its parent unit, the third division.

Ground and air forces are represented in the area of this military district. Training for all branches of the military service is given in the district's units. The military district is divided into the areas of Kouvola, Lappeenranta, Mikkeli, and Savonlinna. The population of the district numbers 520,000 people.

Major General Aapo Savolainen (58), director of the War College, will replace Major General Juhani Ruutu (57) as commander of the military district.

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POLL REVEALS CITIZENS' VIEWS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

Paris LE POINT in French 9 Jun 80 pp 50-52

[Article: "Defense: The Morale of the French"]

[Text] This IFOP [French Public Opinion Insitute] poll was done on the basis of 997 interviews conducted from 8 to 19 May 1980 among a representative sample of the French population of 15 and over.

Risks of War: Yes

1. Does the present international situation involve risks of world war: very strong, moderate, weak or none?

very strong	28%
moderate	47%
weak	11%
none	5%
no opinion	9%

The risks of war are evaluated in very nearly the same way in the different sectors of opinion. However, many more workers (34 percent) than farmers (12 percent) consider this risk very strong. But what can cause war? In a subsidiary question, the French reply, in descending order: the world economic crisis (77 percent); the Soviet initiatives in the world (74 percent); the tensions in the Third World (71 percent); and finally, the American initiatives in the world (64 percent). It is remarkable that 67 percent of Communist voters consider that the Soviet initiatives are a very important or quite important factor for war, and that 66 percent of UDF [French Democratic Union] respondents and 63 percent of RPR [Rally for the Republic] respondents make the same judgment regarding the initiatives of the United States. No matter what their partisan tendencies, the French do not believe in the innocence of either of the two Great Powers.

The Two Great Powers: Imperialists

2. Do you think that today, the USSR has or does not have the desire to extend its influence and its penetration in the various regions of the world?

And the United States?

The USSR:

has the desire	69%
does not have the desire	15%
no opinion	16%

The United States:

has the desire	50%
does not have the desire	30%
no opinion	20%

All the political groups consider the USSR an imperialist country, including the Communist voters (47 percent to 34 percent). Only one political body does not believe in American imperialism--the UDF (34 percent to 49 percent).

3. And do you think that this desire could lead the USSR to take the risk of a world war?

And the United States?

The USSR:

yes	39%
no	38%
no opinion	23%

The United States

yes	28%
no	43%
no opinion	29%

All the same, the French do not lump the USSR and the United States together. Although they consider, by a very slim majority, that the Soviets are capable of taking the risk of a world war, they do not believe--except for the Communists--that such is the case with the Americans.

Oil Is Not Worth a War

4. Suppose that the USSR took military action to cut off the sources of supply of oil and raw materials and that the United States decided to reply militarily. Should France:

intervene militarily alongside the United States	34%
refuse to intervene militarily alongside the United States	41%
no opinion	25%

When we go from a specific case--Africa--to a theoretical case, that of the cutting-off of our supplies of oil or raw materials, the pacificism of the French is not contradicted. The idea of intervening militarily alongside and at the request of the United States is relatively well-accepted by the parties of the majority, but rejected by the Socialists and especially by the Communists, which gives a clearly negative result on the whole.

Africa: French Pacifism

5. In order to cope with a direct or indirect Soviet penetration in Africa, should France:

use political, economic and trade measures	45%
use military means	6%
not intervene, do nothing	30%
no opinion	19%

Now we come to France and its privileged field of action, Africa. It is here that a very strong pacificsm appears for the first time, since only 6 percent of the French think that the use of military means can be envisioned "for coping with a direct or indirect Soviet penetration in Africa," whereas 30 percent are for nonintervention and 45 percent are for recourse to "political, economic and trade" measures.

6. In principle, do you approve or disapprove of the military interventions which Valery Giscard d'Estaing has decided on in recent years in certain African countries?

entirely approve	16%	} 36%
rather approve	20%	
rather disapprove	20%	} 43%
entirely disapprove	23%	
no opinion	21%	

This question positively reinforces the preceding one: the majority of the French condemn the military operations carried out by Giscard in Kolwezi, Chad, in the Central African Empire and against the Polisario Front. It involves a position of principle, but it may be thought that the memory of the colonial wars also influences the judgment of the French. The relation of the differences of evaluation to political opinion should be noted: disapproval comes from the Communists (65 percent), then from the Socialists (5 percent); approval is from the UDF respondents (64 percent), and then from those of the RPR (58 percent).

A Massive No to Use of Nuclear Weaponry

7. Would you or would you not be infavor of the president of the republic's threatening to use French nuclear weapons with the risk of actually having to do so:

if France were actually on the point of being invaded:

in favor	29%
not in favor	58%
no opinion	13%

if the FRG were actually on the point of being invaded:

in favor	14%
not in favor	69%
no opinion	17%

The figures are impressive, since the French reject the president's using the deterrent force not only if the FRG but also if France itself were on the point of being invaded. This rejection is massive and comes from all the political groups: the PCF (66 percent to 26 percent), the PS [Socialist Party] (67 percent to 24 percent), the UDF (46 percent to 43 percent), and the RPR (46 percent to 41 percent). A great difference in evaluation is to be noted in function of sex: 37 percent of men would be in favor of using nuclear weapons to prevent the invasion of France, but only 22 percent of women. As for the idea of defending the FRG by nuclear means, it is approved by only 14 percent of the French. We shall see below that the spirit of European solidarity is still in a very small minority in our country.

8. In principle, are you opposed or not to the use of nuclear weapons by the president of the republic?

opposed	72%
not opposed	19%
no opinion	9%

The replies to this question illustrate well the massive rejection of use of nuclear weapons, shared by 86 percent of the Communists, 82 percent of the Socialists, 62 percent of the UDF respondents, and 38 percent of the RPR respondents. Also, by 77 percent of those under 35, as against only 56 percent of those over 65.

9. Do you think that if the situation arose, Valery Giscard d'Estaing would or would not press the button to unleash the French atomic force?

would press	24%
would not press	49%
no opinion	27%

It must be acknowledged that the specter of the bomb does not haunt the nights of the French too much, since more than one out of two of them is convinced that the president of the republic will not press the button, the most sceptical being the UDF's respondents (53 percent).

10. In principle, if the president of the republic threatened to use atomic weapons, do you think that his decision would be:

approved by the French	12%
disapproved by the French without violent reactions	27%
disapproved by the French with violent reactions	38%
no opinion	23%

Quite naturally, since they are hostile to the use of nuclear weapons, the French think that recourse to them would provoke negative reactions. Violent reactions are prognosticated especially by the Communists (51 percent), the Socialists (40 percent), and the young (41 percent).

11. In case of nuclear attack on France, do you think that it is possible or not for you personally, to escape it?

possible	9%
not possible	72%
no opinion	19%

This table partly explains the responses to the preceding questions: the masses of the French think that in case of nuclear war, they would have no chance of escaping from it. This conviction is shared by the Communists (77 percent), the Socialists (76 percent)! the UDF respondents (71 percent), and somewhat less by the Gaullists (53 percent).

Peace at Any Price: "War Is Too Horrible"

12. Do you think that if the USSR attempted to occupy Western Europe, the United States would intervene to defend it?

the United States would intervene	64%
the United States would not intervene	14%
no opinion	22%

Certain of our leaders are increasingly doubtful about it, but our fellow citizens continue to believe in it: in case of attack on Europe by the USSR, the United States would come to our aid. The RPR and UDF respondents and the Socialists are overwhelmingly convinced of this (between 70 percent and 64 percent), but so are the Communists (59 percent)--though one does not know whether they are happy or unhappy about the idea.

13. Which of these two thoughts do you feel closer to?

War is too horrible, everything should be sacrificed to maintenance of peace	64%
It is better to take the risk of war than the risk of subjugation to a foreign power	22%
no opinion	14%

If the poll ended with this question, one could only conclude that the immense majority of the French are irremediably pacifist. The thought that "war is too horrible, everything should be sacrificed to maintenance of peace" was chosen by 70 percent of the Communists against 14 percent, 69 percent of the Socialists against 21 percent, 68 percent of the UDF members against 26 percent, and 49 percent of the RPR members against 29 percent. We note that this attitude is stronger among women (69 percent) than among men (59 percent), among the young (67 percent) than among the old (62 percent), and among the workers (69 percent) than among the higher-level cadres and the liberal professions (55 percent).

14. If the USSR required as the price of peace that Europe agree to be militarily neutralized and break all alliance with the United States, should France:

accept this	17%
reject it	55%
no opinion	28%

This response to a complex question is relatively ambiguous, since it is not specified by what means France should reject its neutralization. All the same, we note that rejection of a Soviet diktat prevails heavily among all the political tendencies, including the PCF voters (44 percent against 34 percent). The negative response by men (62 percent) and by the higher-level cadres and members of the liberal professions (61 percent) is sharper than that of women (49 percent) and especially of farmers (40 percent). Acceptance of "Finlandization" is more marked in the UDF (17 percent) and in the PS (15 percent) than in the RPR (7 percent).

15. If the French territory were occupied by a foreign army, what would you consider doing?

leave for another country	9%
go into hiding and carry on resistance	37%
wait	30%
carry on passive disobedience	17%
no opinion	12%

Would the French, who at first sight seem so pacifist or so "Munich-minded," wait for their country to be occupied before showing a spirit of resistance? One might believe so on noting that 32 percent of them (including 45 percent

of the Communists and 34 percent of the Socialists) would be ready to go into hiding. However, we note that the responses "leave for another country," "wait," and "carry on passive disobedience" altogether total 56 percent. Here is the breakdown of the spirit of resistance by occupational categories: workers, 36 percent; white-collar workers and middle-level cadres, 35 percent; higher-level cadres and liberal professions, 32 percent; farmers, 30 percent; unemployed, 23 percent. Let us take these results for what they are: a simple indication.

16. For each of the following things, tell me whether, in your opinion, it is worth or not worth the effort to fight in a military conflict:

for defense of liberties:

worth the effort	79%
not worth the effort	10%
no opinion	11%

for defense of the national territory:

worth the effort	72%
not worth the effort	17%
no opinion	11%

for preservation of the country's vital economic interests:

worth the effort	59%
not worth the effort	27%
no opinion	14%

for defense of Western Europe:

worth the effort	41%
not worth the effort	42%
no opinion	17%

The response to this last question should inspire prudence in all those who would like to make too much of the results of this poll. When the problem of defense--by arms--of liberties or the national territory is posed in general terms, one finds that overwhelming majorities reply positively. Just as the prospect of a war is rejected when it is revoked in concrete terms, so is the idea accepted that certain causes are worth defending. But it should be noted that the concept of Western Europe does not mean a great deal to half of the French, especially to the left. Only the RPR members (59 percent), the UDF members (51 percent) and the higher-level cadres (51 percent) consider by an absolute majority that this Europe deserves to be defended.

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CSO: 3100

VIEW OF FRENCH PUBLIC: NOTHING WORTH NUCLEAR WAR

Paris LE POINT in French 9 Jun 80 pp 48-49

[Article by Andre Chambraud: "Nuclear Weaponry: A Fear of Apocalypse"]

[Text] No to war, whatever may happen--this is the opinion of the majority of the French, according to an IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute]-LE POINT poll. The main reason for this visceral pacifism--atomic fear--raises a serious military and political problem.

Since the beginning of time, men have lived in familiarity with war. And wars have even served as waypoints in the march of time. As recently as 25 years ago, at the Institute of Political Studies of Paris, Prof Louis Chevalier presented his course in contemporary history (1919-1939) as follows: first part, from the war to the crisis (that of 1929); second part, from the crisis to the war. And if in 1918 the French had believed for a brief instant that they had won the "war to end all wars," the illusion did not last long. It was only from the 1960's, with economic prosperity and East-West detente, that the idea that war--well, at least for us--had ended entered discreetly into the popular consciousness.

Now the fear of a conflict is invading our consciousness, troubling us and casting doubt on a good many of our certitudes--a harsh awakening! Most of the experts, to be sure, including those in the camp of the hawks, do not believe in the triggering of a nuclear conflict between East and West in the foreseeable future. However, when we note the multiplication of sites of conflict in the world, we are not entirely certain of this.

How are we reacting in the face of these new perspectives? What shape is the nation's morale in in this time of fear? It is these questions that the important IFOP poll that we publish today (see following article) tries to give an answer to.

Reading its results, everyone will naturally react according to his temperament. Some will denounce the surrender by a country which seems even more Munich-minded than at the time of the Munich agreements (57 percent of the French approved them, while 37 percent considered them ill-fated, according

to one of the first polls carried out in France). Others, though, will see the replies to certain questions as a sign that the French still have capacities for being aroused. Since it is absurd and useless to declare a collectivity of millions of persons courageous or cowardly--the cowardly and the courageous are to1 to be counted one at a time--it is a better idea to try to bring out the three reasons that explain the present attitude of the French in the face of the risks of war: they now consider France a middle-size power; they have bid farewell to arms; and their fear of the nuclear weapon is such that if care is not taken about it, it will put the effectiveness of our deterrent force in question.

When, in 1938, Edouard Daladier went to Munich to hand Czechoslovakia over to Hitler, the French Army was considered one of the leading ones in a world of which Europe was still the center. Today, matters are no longer like that at all: the overwhelming military superiority of the two Great Powers is recognized by all the French, who therefore withdraw into their shells and nurture distrust. Very conscious of the imperialism of the USSR, but also of that of the United States, they agree to the least possible solidarity with their American ally. Naturally, this desire not to be taken in entails a fine hypocrisy: the French consider it established beyond doubt that the United States would come to their aid in case of Soviet aggression. But at the same time, they would refuse to take military action alongside America if the Soviets were to cut off the free world's sources of oil supply. France decidedly considers itself too small for such great combats.

The last sign of our massive will to do nothing is the fact that the idea of going to war to defend our West German neighbor and our friends of Western Europe is in the minority in the country.

For the French, then, war is over; or rather, it should be over. Valery Giscard d'Estaing is proud of his military interventions in Africa, particularly in Kolwezi; but this poll reveals that a majority of the French make an overall condemnation of this kind of operation. And only 6 percent of them think we should use our military means to confront direct or indirect Soviet penetration in the dark continent.

Thus, even when our traditional zones of influence or military operatins of conventional type are involved, recourse to arms is rejected. The awareness of being now a middle-size power is obviously not unrelated to this desire for disengagement.

The third lesson--quite a dumbfounding one--of the poll is the panic fear that nuclear weaponry inspires in the French. All the responses agree: "No, the president should not threaten to use nuclear weaponry, with the risk of actually having to use it," even "if France were actually on the point of being invaded." "Yes, we are opposed on principle to the use of nuclear weapons by the president." Furthermore, more than one Frenchman out of two is convinced that Giscard will never press the button, and 38 percent expect that if he did so, he would unleash violent reactions in the country.

Of course, this fear of nuclear weaponry is quite naturally explained by its inherent character and its enormous capacity for destruction. But there is more. Although war has, over the centuries, always been an evil and a curse, it has also, despite everything, been an event whose development was imaginable, almost predicted. Let us recall those images of Epinal that are still present in the collective consciousness. One evening, the alarm bell rang in the village. The men embraced their wives and went off. They were given weapons, uniforms, and one day, as the song says, "they were led onto a great field that was called a battlefield." Many died, but some came back, and life in the village began again.

Beyond the anguish, then, for each of them there remained hope. But today, to listen to the French, there is no longer anything but the prospect of annihilation: 72 percent as against 9 percent believe that in case of nuclear attack they would not be able to escape it.

Such is the great lesson of this poll. Of course, it also opens up some less negative perspectives: the French are not ready to accept the "Finlandization" of the country, and a very strong majority say they are determined to fight for defense of liberties or preservation of the national territory. But when their "no" to war is evoked in concrete terms, it is actually a "no" to a "nonwar." For in their minds, an atomic conflict would not mean a fight but rather an immolation.

Thus, one of themost formidable problems faced by today's democracies is revealed in a terribly stark light. If France were to renounce atomic weaponry, it would probably renounce defending itself, and in any case, preserving its independence. But having opted for the only weapon that counts now--that is, the deterrent force--our country has chosen a system which, before it causes fright in the adversary, begins by terrorizing those who possess it. Under such conditions, can the president of a free country take the decision, if the case should arise, of pressing the button against the opinion of an entire people? Isn't belief in such determination, on which our deterrent capacity depends, henceforth compromised? This is the whole question.

Of course, and more than ever, this poll has to be taken for what it is--that is, a photograph of public opinion at a given instant. And it has been seen, in other circumstances, how apparently demoralized peoples could all of a sudden mobilize.

However, the chief of state himself sees the problem, it is said: he notes uneasily that the extreme sophistication of the theory of deterrence and the secrecy that envelops our diplomacy digs a gap between the calculations of the strategists, the analyses of the diplomats, and the feelings of public opinion.

Is this unavoidable fate? It should not be considered so. After all, French politicians as a whole have rallied to nuclear weaponry. To explain this weaponry, to demonstrate its capacity and logic, to reflect on the way

to have a more popular defense along with it: these are becoming absolutely priority tasks for the parties and for the president.

In the absence of which, it would have to be concluded that use of atomic weaponry is reserved to the countries without organized public opinion--that is, to the totalitarian countries--and is forbidden to the democracies.

11267
CSO: 3100

PRESIDENT ANSWERS MAIN DEFENSE-RELATED QUESTIONS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 Jun 80 p 2

[Press conference with Valery Giscard d'Estaing, by Paul-Marie de la Gorce" "Deterrent Force, Neutron Bombs, Nuclear Submarines"]

[Text] The president of the republic is scheduled to discuss defense issues during his press conference today. In the following article, Paul-Marie de la Gorce answers the main defense-related questions Frenchmen are currently asking.

Question: What is the present status of the French deterrent force?

Answer: The national strategic forces consist of the following components: five nuclear missile-launching submarines (SSBN) that are to be joined in 1985 by a sixth submarine carrying 16 M-4 missiles armed with several megaton-yield [as published] nuclear warheads and having a range of 4,000 kilometers; some 50 Mirage 4 bombers carrying H-bombs; and 18 surface-to-surface missiles in underground silos on the Albion Plateau, missiles now being gradually replaced by the new S-3 version armed with a 1-megaton warhead and having a range of approximately 3,500 kilometers. In addition, there are the tactical nuclear forces, namely five regiments of Pluton [surface-to-surface missiles]--a total of 30 missiles--and units of the Tactical Air Force (FATAC), including three squadrons of Jaguar aircraft and two squadrons of Mirage 3 aircraft, all carrying AN-52 nuclear bombs.

Some 150 Targets

Assuming that there will be a certain percentage of losses and that two submarines will be inoperative because in drydock for routine maintenance and repair, it is estimated that approximately 150 targets would be destroyed by the French national strategic forces.

Question: How would that force be employed?

Answer: Targets the national strategic force could destroy are designated in a "strike plan" that is periodically revised. This strategic force is obviously not a counterforce force. France cannot reasonably expect

to arm itself so as to destroy thousands of military targets, many of which it is highly difficult or impossible to reach. Consequently the strategic force is designed to strike at the bulk of an enemy's human and economic resources. If we have only a few "atomic bombs," we can target only a few of the principal cities. But if we can attack some 150 different points, as is now the case, it is better to schedule a wide range of targets consisting of several dozen large cities and at the same time several dozen key economic or technical centers, including transportation centers, communications facilities, etc. This is what is meant by the term "expanded anticities strategy."

It is assumed, for planning purposes, that the Soviet Union is the potential enemy. But that country is also the hardest to deter because of the dispersion of its population and its economic resources. It would be much easier to destroy any other power. Furthermore, the lag between the decision to develop a weapon system and its deployment is nearly 10 years. And the lifetime of a weapon system is more than 20 years. Hence this decision must be made on the basis of a forecast covering a third of a century. And nobody can tell what international relations will be like a third of a century from now.

In addition, it must be clearly realized that we would not deter a power that could strike French territory without our being able to attack its territory. In such a situation, we would have to either yield to that power's "nuclear ultimatum" or accept a conventional conflict that we could not possibly win because of our country's dimensions. That is why any effective deterrence must be "omnidirectional," and the SSBN is the very weapon of that strategy. As long as we continue to develop that weapon system, French strategy will remain one of "omnidirectional" deterrence.

Question: Can the deterrent force be destroyed in one fell swoop?

Answer: To negate French deterrence, an aggressor would first have to destroy our strategic nuclear forces. Could an aggressor do this? In the present state of the art, an aggressor would not be able to detect and locate SSBN's that are practically invulnerable. When airborne, the Mirage 4 bombers protect themselves quite effectively by their speed and by electronic countermeasures. These aircraft would have to be destroyed on the ground. Their protection lies in their constant change of base, and in the event of any threat of emergency, they would obviously have to become airborne.

The Albion Plateau missiles are the most vulnerable component because they are in fixed sites. But their destruction in one fell swoop is deemed impossible. Because of their relative dispersion and their underground sites, a strike against them would require such a number of missiles and nuclear warheads that the explosions thereof would neutralize each other (this is what is known as the "fratricidal" effect of multiple nuclear

explosions in the same locality). Everything that would not have been destroyed by the initial attack would immediately be launched against the territory of the aggressor. In fact, by such an attack, the latter would unequivocally show himself as the aggressor and would, without the slightest doubt, incur retaliatory attacks by the French strategic forces.

Nevertheless, the more or less great vulnerability of the different weapon systems makes it necessary to develop several systems to avoid "technological breakthroughs" that would enable an adversary to destroy the systems. In addition, it is necessary to expand the most invulnerable system (the SSBN's) so that, assuming all other sytems were destroyed, it alone is capable of executing the entire "strike plan." This is clearly why priority is being given to increasing the number and firepower of our nuclear submarines.

Question: What is the connection between the strategic forces and the tactical nuclear forces?

Answer: According to one initial concept, Western forces would have to wage a large-scale battle against Warsaw Pact forces, and to win that battle, would have to commit all of their resources, nuclear as well as conventional. In such a battle, tactical nuclear weapons would be employed as a sort of "superartillery."

If France were to adopt this concept, it would imply France's participation in that battle, and consequently the combining, from the outset, of French forces with NATO forces and their being placed under an American commander who would implement a strategy determined in actual practice by a general staff subordinate to the President of the United States. Hence adoption of this concept would lead to France's de facto reintegration into NATO. This is the critical observation made, and rightly so, about the recent UDF [Union for French Democracy] party's report on defense, a report advocating French participation with conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons in the battle NATO decides to wage.

As we shall see, this concept has probably been outmoded by the evolution in weaponry (see second to last question and answer below). In any case, however, this concept is totally at variance with the French doctrine which holds that this type of battle leads to a quantitative clash of forces in which Western Europe, and France in particular, would inevitably be defeated. Warsaw Pact forces are, in effect, vastly numerically superior to Western forces. This superiority is no theoretical assessment but an actual fact. Official French doctrine states, therefore, that tactical nuclear weapons are always employed as a final warning before employment of the strategic force.

Question: What is the national deterrent force's future?

Answer: The dangerous possibility that a "technological breakthrough" by an opposing power may render any one of our weapon systems vulnerable obliges us to continuously diversify our strategic nuclear forces. We must, therefore, rule out improving only one of those forces.

As things stand at present, and for the unforeseeable and certainly very distant future, SSBN's are practically invulnerable. Hence their number is being so increased that, if necessary, they can alone carry out the mission assigned to the deterrent forces as a whole. Because of the mounting vulnerability of fixed forces, plans are being made for an SSBS (Surface-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic) missile, in other words, a missile similar to the one in the Albion Plateau silos but ground transportable and highly mobile.

Road Movement Problems

A "full-scale" test has been made. The conclusions drawn therefrom are quite definite: even in a country like France which has relatively unpopulated regions--in the Norman forest or the Central Highlands (Massif Central)--the movement, with necessary protection, by road of vehicles carrying missiles armed with nuclear warheads would run into countless physical impossibilities--grade crossings, traffic jams, built-up areas--that would exacerbate the psychological obstacles (misgivings of the civilian population). Moreover, such movement would quickly be spotted. Efforts will, therefore, be directed toward SSBS missiles that are both mobile and hidden underground.

This same preoccupation with mobility has brought out the full value of the air component of the nuclear forces. But this time, that component would consist of an aircraft which would not have to penetrate deeply over enemy territory, but would have to possess such range and speed as to ensure its invulnerability. This aircraft's mission would be to launch a long-range air-to-surface missile.

Question: What is the present status of the debate about the neutron bomb?

Answer: Judging from the bitterness of the controversy stirred up by this issue, a person might think the neutron bomb is a weapon that would radically change all of the basic aspects of any possible future war. The neutron bomb is actually an enhanced-radiation weapon, in other words, a device whose neutron radiation would cause more personnel casualities, particularly by piercing armor, and would have less blast and thermal effect, thus producing less material damage. In actual fact, everything depends on the employment doctrine adopted for this weapon.

New Maginot Line

Supporters of the neutron bomb think it could be massively deployed along the border between East and West and bar any enemy offensive, like a sort of new Maginot Line. In that case, the production of neutron bombs would imply a radical change in France's strategy and consequently its defense policy, inasmuch as we would have no other choice but to insert our own weapons into the NATO system.

This concept is highly questionable from a technical standpoint, in that weapons deployed in this manner would be practically fixed and thus could be destroyed by a preventive strike. In addition, its effectiveness against highly mobile targets, such as advancing forces, is debatable. Nevertheless, another method of employing the neutron bomb is conceivable. It may be used as a tactical weapon, within the framework of current French strategy, as a means of limiting the collateral damage that is bound to be inflicted within allied territory. Or we can study its possible strategic employment, for example, as a means of destroying the populations of the enemy's cities rather than the cities themselves. For this reason, the most likely decision will not be to produce neutron bombs as it is now possible to do, but instead to continue studies designed to determine their possible advantages and effectiveness in terms of options permitted by the current strategy.

Question: What effects will the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles have on the French strategy?

Answer: The Soviet SS-20 missile can deliver three nuclear warheads out to a range of 3,500 kilometers with an accuracy of 200-300 meters. By firing one or two salvos, these missiles can destroy all of the NATO infrastructure and forces in Western Europe. This involves attacking some 500-600 separate targets. France is known to rely solely on deterrence for its security. Yet all fixed elements of its conventional or tactical nuclear forces have become vulnerable and it is, therefore, essential that its strategic forces be as mobile as possible.

Question: What effects will deployment of the American Pershing 2 and cruise missiles have on French strategy?

Answer: The United States has persuaded its NATO partners to agree that the response to the SS-20 would be the deployment of 572 Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain. The first sites for these weapons were recently selected in Great Britain some 60 to 120 kilometers from London. This decision gives rise to two major objections. Installed in highly urbanized and industrialized areas intersected by countless roads, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, etc., these weapons will have no real mobility. The fact that sites for them have already been selected is quite revealing. They are, therefore, but additional targets for a preventive SS-20 strike and would be destroyed

before being used. If some of them were to escape unscathed from such a strike, their effectiveness would be very substantially reduced by the mobility of their targets: the forces they are supposed to destroy--divisions, headquarters, depots, etc.--would be moving. In any case, their deployment does in no way alter French strategic reasoning. Their employment would not weaken either the effectiveness or credibility of our deterrent forces because the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles are counter-force weapons, whereas French deterrence remains based on an anticipatory strategy.

8041
CSO: 3100

MOBILE STRATEGIC MISSILE APPROVED FOR 1992

Paris LE MATIN in French 28-29 Jun 80 p 3

[Article: "Mobile Strategic Missile by 1992"]

[Text] At his press conference on Thursday, Valery Giscard d'Estaing announced that the Defense Council, at its latest meeting, had approved development of a mobile strategic launcher. The main characteristics of this new weapon system are expected to be defined at another meeting of the Defense Council this fall.

This so-called SX missile is scheduled to supplement the nuclear missile-launching submarines (SSBN's) in the French nuclear arsenal by 1992. It should be noted that the President of the Republic made no mention whatever in his press conference of a possible increase in the number of SSBN's. The new SX weapon system will reportedly become operational at a time when the Albion Plateau missiles will have become extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks.

It is with this situation in mind that French defense planners conceived development of a mobile missile with a range of 4,000 kilometers and mounted on a truck or carried by transport aircraft. The missile's mobility would preclude its being spotted by enemy detection equipment. As a matter of fact, it would be more logical for the system to be semi-mobile with the launchers and missiles being moved only in the event of a crisis and being stored on military bases the rest of the time.

The SX missile's technology is derived from that of the naval M-4 missile which is armed with six nuclear warheads and is scheduled to equip the sixth nuclear submarine, L'Inflexible, in 1985. For obvious reasons of weight and hence of mobility, the SX missile had been conceived up to now as carrying only one nuclear warhead. But Atomic Energy Commission researchers now state they have the capability of arming it with three warheads. It will be up to the Defense Council to settle this issue.

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CSO: 3100

PSF EXECUTIVE BUREAU CONTINUES DEBATE ON NEUTRON BOMB

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Jun 80 p 28

[Article by Jacques Lenard: "A Neutral Weapon"]

[Text] After 3 hours of debate led by Francois Mitterrand, the PSF Executive Bureau, which met Wednesday 18 June in Paris, did not reach a decision on the problem of the neutron bomb but decided to postpone approval of a text stating the conclusions of its deliberations until its next meeting on Wednesday 25 June, that is, the day after the press conference by the party's first secretary.

According to Pierre Beregovoy, the PSF finds itself in agreement on two essential points: deterrence is necessary to the security of France, and France must retain its capability of autonomous decision within the framework of its alliances. It appears, according to certain members of the Executive Bureau, that the Socialists can finally agree on the idea of strengthening strategic deterrence, on the advantage of so-called experimental tactical weapons, and on the possibility of continuing research on the neutron bomb without, for all that, deciding to deploy it.

On the subject of military service, the PSF now advocates 6 months' universal service followed by a 2 month period [of mobilization assignment training].

With the humor often characteristic of American researchers when expounding their work, nuclear physicist Samuel T. Cohen, considered one of the neutron bomb's inventors in the United States, is wont to say of that weapon that it can be impartially marxist, capitalist, or Christian. Despite his readily provocative extravagance, could there be some truth in those words? Could the neutron bomb, like Aesop's tongue, be at once the worse and the best of things?

For several months the polemics launched in France on this particular subject have been obscured and wantonly confused by an a priori refusal, on all sides, to distinguish between the existence of the neutron weapon and the use which one can, or wishes, to make of it. Once these theological debates, with their presuppositions and their mistaking of the will for the deed, have deferred to a more serious examination of the question--what if the neutron weapon does then prove to be neutral, or, to avoid this play on words as out of place when dealing with an engine of death, to be a weapon which lends itself without distinction to all concepts of defense?

Some explain that it is a battlefield weapon which leads to the "routinising" of recourse to nuclear means and severe tactical nuclear weapons from their initial function as arrestors or warning shots given by a victim of aggression to warn its adversary that the latter will be threatened by instantaneous and massive use of strategic deterrence weapons if it persists in its aggression.

It is thus a weapon marking the decline of deterrence and outbidding other arms, a theater weapon, a super-artillery which carries the risk of having to delegate the initiative of tactical fire orders to subordinate operational commands in the field. It means the possibility, they add, of introducing into the process of using the deterrent force intermediate stages which would diminish the credibility of theprocess and further the likelihood of battle as opposed to "non-war."

To which others respond that theneutron bomb can become a political weapon, negotiable and useful as an exchange currency in international discussions on disarmament, if only the partners in such conversations are convinced in advance of the will and capacity of their interlocutor--on his own--to carry out successful development of this type of weapon. In France certain partisans of this thesis advocate, moreover, a renovation of the Atlantic alliance, to which they remain attached independently of their political alignments, and see in possession of the neutron weapon the useful and indeed necessary means of imposing, in the name of Europe, this "aggiornamento [i.e. modernization] of the Western camp.

A Weapon Like Others

Still others, finally, base their position on the fierceness with which the Soviet Union launched its worldwide campaign against the neutron bomb. They do not hesitate to name the potential adversary, and wish to consider only the effectiveness of this weapon in every hypothetical conflict, be it the strict defense of the national "sanctuary," participation by France in protecting Europe's approaches, or possibly more distant battles on the periphery of interests regarded as vital. In these conditions the neutron weapon becomes a tactical nuclear weapon like others, though one--if we may say so--with enhanced radiation effects.

To the followers of this doctrine, the neutron bomb, envisaged in small numbers to complement a tactical panoply consisting essentially of present types of fission nuclear weapons, would act to strengthen the capacity to warn an adversary by permitting first the neutralization and then the capture of certain very precise objectives--such as his concentrations of armor--without for all that destroying the environment or preventing all military exploitation of that advantage by a later occupation of his territory.

The neutron bomb is all these things at once. Except for the important detail that it is radically incompatible with the "all or nothing" doctrine in nuclear matters, otherwise known as "absolute" deterrence which offers the choice of mutual apocalypse if strategic thunderbolts are loosed by both sides, or capitulation if one of the protagonists refuses to ignite the powderkeg. But France abandoned this "all or nothing" theory in 1970 when Gen Michel Fourquet, Armed Forces Chief of Staff under President Pompidou, admitted the need for gradual nuclear actions and experimental weapons.

Fundamentally, the neutron bomb is not a heresy at variance with strategic principles hitherto adopted, except for the consideration that the French Government, after having resigned itself to abdication of its freedom of action, now proposes to put this new weapon at the service of another defense policy.

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CSO: 3100

PSF'S JOSPIN SEES PARTY DECIDING AGAINST NEUTRON BOMB

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Jun 80 p 12

[Text] The building by France of the neutron bomb was brought up on Tuesday 17 June by Lionel Jospin, PSF national secretary charged with international relations, in Limoges where before taking part in a public meeting he was the guest of the press club. While guarding against any anticipation of the final decision, Jospin, coauthor of the report to be presented Wednesday evening to the PSF Executive Bureau, declared: "I do not think the Socialist Party will be found in a position of accepting the neutron bomb." He stressed the necessity, in the face of the present armaments race by both East and West, of setting in motion the machinery of disarmament. Jospin also considered that military service should be "shorter and more useful" and that "democratic values" should be "introduced into it."

6145
CSO: 3100

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RENEGES ON 1980 BUDGET

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 29/30 Jun 80 p 10

[Article by Ww: "Budgetary Retreat of the European Parliament: Successful Weardown Tactics of the Ministerial Council"]

[Text] Luxembourg, 27 June--The budgetary front established by the European Parliament as a consequence of the rejection of the Community's 1980 budget last December has collapsed. At a 2-day special session in Luxembourg the European parliamentarians gave in to the weardown tactics of the ministerial council. Only cosmetic traces remain of the erst-while parliamentary attempt to use the budget as a tool to force the council into its designed legislative role. The deputies need these traces to preserve face in front of the electorate, and to maintain their self-confidence.

Continuation of the Adoption Procedures

On Friday the EC Chamber of Deputies, in a 4-hour session, after dealing with more than 100 proposed amendments, passed a 1980 budget of the European Community that is hardly different from the latest proposal of the council. Total authorized expenditures remain unchanged at 15.7 billion ecus; some marginal changes have been made in some figures. The council has not yet addressed itself to these modifications. Should it accept these cosmetic changes and not insist on others, then the draft can finally be approved by the President of the European Community, Simone Veil, according to the charter. Political wisdom would suggest that the council follow this line, should it refrain from basking in its position of strength, otherwise parliamentary reactions at subsequent debates could not be discounted.

In the power struggle between the council and the parliament the former has come out ahead. It will not be easy for parliament to claim the right for common consultation with the same naturalness that it had felt in the wake of the first direct elections with a new democratic legitimacy. However, the struggle of the community's budget authorities has only resulted in the loss of the first decisive round. Further rounds will follow in the coming years. The understanding of the council, currently requested in very modest terms, might help to pave the way for a somewhat more trusting

collaboration between parliament and council, provided that the comprehension is given without excessive reluctance. There are certainly indications for this development; after all, steps, decisions and limitations of the one will cause reflection by the other party that otherwise would hardly have taken place. In this sense the "parliamentary show of force" in the budgetary tug-of-war is justified in retrospect too.

Mutually Exclusive Motives

In its report to the plenary assembly the parliamentary budget committee points out that the decision to reject the budget last December was based not so much on a united front of the house than on several, sometimes mutually exclusive motives. The growing number of dissidents became apparent at the latest during the debate over current agrarian prices. Now the Christian Democrat Frueh, deputy chairman of the agrarian committee, reluctantly states that much anger could have been avoided if the political possibilities would have been more realistically judged and more clearly perceived last December. There should be an end to the practice to blame the agrarian policy for everything. The renewed rise of national and economic special interests--not only agrarian policy--among the deputies, as well as the desire finally to settle the budget quarrel of 1980, are said to suffocate the parliament's freedom of action in the budget question. The Social Democrat Lange warned that the crisis within the community had merely been postponed. As early as 1981 the EC's constitutionally fixed financial framework could be overextended.

Of the main parliamentary groups the socialists and the communists have most consistently adhered to their position of last December. The change in attitude and the acceptance of the primacy of the ministerial council was primarily effected by the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the British Conservatives, who without much remorse jettisoned their erstwhile precious principles. Thus the budget approved by the parliamentary majority for 1980 retained the substantial increases in the agrarian sector, did not finance the EC's development fund and the EC credit policy, and resulted in a modest exceeding of the parliament's freedom of action in financial matters. Not much remained of the former conditions for acceptance; the boundaries laid down by the ministerial council were respected practically to the full extent.

9240
CSO: 3103

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

East-West Economic Relations

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French No 7, Spring 80 pp 244-249

[Anita Tiraspolsky Review of "East-West Economic Relations," Marie Lavigne, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979; and "The Soviet and European Socialist Economies," Armand Colin, 1979]

[Text] If in the course of the 1960's it was possible to believe in progression of the two concurrent systems--"capitalism and socialism"--toward a hybrid or synthetic industrial society under the impulse of the technological revolution, now the evidence should be looked at: the convergence of the systems through internal transformation which J. Tinbergen, R. Aron and J. K. Galbraith were extolling could not come about in a context of world-wide economic stagnation. A new outline has taken shape: a kind of convergence by contamination, resting on the interdependence of the systems. Marie Lavigne, Professor of Economic Sciences, considers it more realistic to discount a durable coexistence between imperfect systems, each one of them including its own characteristics and elements that can be found in the other system, with many variations.

Implicitly, "The Soviet and European Socialist Economies," a work that has been entirely recast and published 10 years after the first edition, and even more "East-West Economic Relations," strive for that coexistence. In fact, if the aim of the author is to submit to the consideration of Western readers a considerable sum of knowledge (together with rich personal experience of those countries), we must not for that reason lose sight of essentials. All the points of view, landmarks, and questions that Marie Lavigne presents, if they are necessary for the formation of judgments and appreciations, come to a single conclusion: "Only (...) peace can be a common objective of both ideologies whether that be considered as the proper condition for business or as that of the consolidation of socialism."

Before going on to an analysis in depth, may we be permitted a few remarks on the similar method used in both works. Whether it be a question of national economies or foreign relations, the same meticulous procedure is

used. This consists of looking at the existing institutions and structures from all angles, or unraveling the mechanisms of functions which have become more and more complex, of facing and finally explaining in time and in space the performances and the results. For one who knows the difficulties of access to information on the socialist countries and the problems presented by the sources and the statistical data on international exchanges, we can only be grateful to the author for having put at our disposition not only such a complete "chest of tools" but also an extremely rigorous and precise way of using them.

The user of Soviet statistics no longer finds, as formerly, deliberately falsified data. However, if the quality of the figures has been improved, the statistics have not for that reason become more homogeneous in time: from one year to the next, series are interrupted, presentations are modified. The socialist camp itself has not achieved its statistical unity: comparisons between countries are often made impossible because the statistical headings do not follow the same definitions. Finally, if we work simultaneously on data from the West and from the East, the difficulties become almost insurmountable. One example: the indebtedness of the socialist countries to the West is a subject of great argument. How can the discrepancies between the figures be reconciled? We learned, in fact, that the accumulated trade balance of the member countries of OECD with the USSR for the period from 1960 to 1972, according to the statistics of the USSR, shows a deficit of $1.9 billion and a surplus of $2.9 billion according to the statistics of the OECD, or a difference of $4.8 billion! However, let's get to the contents of the two books.

"East-West Economic Relations" opens with a paradox. The author warns us that quantitatively the subject deserves only a mention: East-West trade represents less than three percent of world trade. It is therefore necessary to justify her interest, and one thesis binds the entire study together: the real stakes of East-West relations are political whatever may be the gains for one party or the other in the exchange, whatever the favorable or negative repercussions of the trade and cooperation on the domestic economies. It is no doubt for that reason that Marie Lavigne minimizes the effects of the crisis on the Eastern countries; taking up this theme in conclusion, she emphasizes that growing difficulties undergone by those countries during the 1970-1980 decade are chiefly due to internal causes. Now we are sent back to "The Soviet and European Socialist Economies" where, by means of the structures and mechanisms of those economies, an explanation can be found for the disturbances which are affecting them today.

"East-West Economic Relations" begins by initiating the reader into the evaluation of the exchanges, an arduous subject if there is one, but necessary for any serious understanding. Then the specificity of economic relations between the two systems is analyzed (political stakes, bilateral and multilateral institutions, organization and planning of trade in the socialist countries, commercial policy with regard to the Eastern countries). Finally, a question is asked: do industrial cooperation and financial

mechanisms really bring about a mutual advantage for both parties, or unilateral gains for one--the socialist countries?

Already perceptible in the battles of figures relative to the indebtedness of Eastern Europe, the polemical dimension of East-West relations is manifest as soon as their institutional framework and their ways of doing business are taken up. The author has chosen to illustrate this predominance of politics over economic and commercial considerations by the relationships between America and the Eastern countries.

Do you remember in the United States the granting of the most favored nation clause and the providing of public credit for exports to the East are narrowly tied to such conditions as the absence of restrictions on immigration or the respect for human rights? Is the existence of the COCOM (Coordinating Committee) also kept in mind? This institution was created on 1 January 1950. It comprises the 15 NATO States (less Iceland) plus Japan and meets in Paris. The COCOM was born from the unilateral embargo policy of the United States, "Decreed in 1947 to interdict the export of strategic goods toward the communist countries, several months after the beginning of the Marshall Plan." Still today the COCOM establishes lists of products forbidden by the embargo. the fixing of quotas, or even simple surveillance.

However weak its authority may be, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975 (in its second meeting devoted--in principle--only to economic relations) also strengthens the thesis of amalgamation by specifying that the objectives of cooperation are as much political as they are economic and social. It is further significant that trade must be organized within the framework of intereatique [translation unknown] institutions and agreements, essentially bilateral. The long history of contacts between CEMA and the European Economic Community, the particular nature of the relations between the FRG and the GDR illustrate equally clearly the interpenetration of politics and economies.

On another level, the organization of foreign trade in the socialist countries can contribute to explaining the specific nature of East-West economic relations. The monopoly of the state in foreign trade and the authoritative planning of exchanges--however flexible it may be--are in the background of all the commercial strategies and negotiations that the Eastern countries carry on. Those two basic principles leave the field open to the power of a central authority which must introduce economic constraints and political elements, even if that power is delegated to several administrators. In fact, doesn't the history of East-West economic relations reveal the role that political authorities have played in the socialist countries in the marginalization of foreign trade? Traditionally, exporting is only a necessary evil, the means for covering indispensable imports.

The countries of the East, which are countries with state trade, are the subject of a special treatment when they wish to profit from the rules of

the game now going on between market economies. The most favored nation clause is "managed" in their regard; it is not enough for them to propose tariff concessions to get them in their turn, it is necessary that they effectively facilitate the access of their Western partners to their markets. The debate on protectionism clearly shows the existence of a political conflict behind the behaviors that pretend to be strictly economic (except for the United States, which lays it cards on the table). However, don't the Eastern countries themselves believe in that politicization when they rise up together against the common foreign tariff, the quantitative restrictions, the application of the safeguard clause, the anti-dumping regulation, the technical and security norms? Are they right in considering that the application of contingencies in regard to them is in itself a sign of distrust, even if in fact the number of contingencies used is clearly smaller than the number theoretically applicable under the Community's regulations? Furthermore, if on the socialist side there are no contingencies strictly fixed against the imports coming from the capitalist countries, the Plan all by itself seems to us to greatly depend on Western protectionism. However, that is not Marie Lavigne's opinion. She justified her position thus: "When the Plan defines an article to be imported and the order is honored, it cannot be interpreted as a quantitative restriction: it is an order for a purchase to be made, not a limit which cannot be exceeded." In practice, in fact, the distinction is very subtle.

These few illustrations which, from afar, do not illustrate the wealth of Marie Lavigne's work, are nevertheless sufficient to show, if there is any need for it, that within the evolution of East-West trade, political and economic interference is true of both the concurrent economic systems.

This same phenomenon can be observed in economic cooperation. During recent years, the forces that have impelled the two systems to take part in mutual cooperation (for the West: a search for markets, raw materials, cheaper labor; for the East: the acquisition of machinery and technologies necessary to go beyond the stage of extensive growth) have been developed in parallel to conflicting forces, each concurring camp wishing to keep control of its own economy and of its own policy and to preserve them as much as possible from outside disturbances. However, it may seem excessive to want to reduce the whole of "East-West Economic Relations" to this simple antagonism. In our opinion, it is not completely sufficient to explain the remarkable take-off of East-West trade during the period from 1965 to 1975, which shows a higher rate of expansion than that of international trade (an increase of 22.8 percent per year for exports from the socialist countries to the West between 1970 and 1975, an increase of 30.8 percent for their imports, compared with the increase of world trade during the same period, on the order of 22 percent per year).

It does not explain the high level of indebtedness of the Eastern countries ($52.7 billion of net indebtedness at the close of 1977, without any doubt between $56 and $60 billion at the end of 1978), nor above all does it explain the growing dichotomy in East-West relations, nor in the East the

friction between the USSR and the other European countries of CEMA, nor in the West--but to a smaller degree--the differences between the FRG and the rest of Europe.

Perhaps we should rather subscribe to a more strictly economic explanation and admit that if there has been expansion, indebtedness, efforts to adopt the forms of Western economic cooperation, it is because the socialist countries have not had any other solution permitting a rapid climb to a qualitative level of industrial development comparable to that of the West. In fact, the network of East-West interdependence seems in many cases to be ordered by considerations such as historical commercial traditions or the complementary distribution of resources, which in the end justify by themselves the trade behavior of both parties.

Without seeking to prophesy, Marie Lavigne, at the end of her inquiry, formulates a few very simple ideas which should be taken into serious consideration in future scenarios. Although they are marginal in world relations, East-West relations cannot really be analyzed as East-West relations: they can no longer be isolated from the Western international division of labor nor from the internal evolutions proper to the socialist economies.

Most particularly, two of the author's ideas will be retained.

In 10 years, the Eastern countries have widened their opening onto the West. This is undeniable and it does not seem to have been challenged. That opening appears on the economic level as a "bringer of advantages, but also a generator of disturbances." Advantages to the degree where the socialist countries, as they compare their performances to those of the Western countries, can, for example, apply rational choices of specialization which permit them to improve their gains from the exchange. Disturbances, especially when the inflationary tensions originating abroad come to increase the effects of domestic economic breakdowns; disturbances in particular when a concern for reducing their indebtedness leads those countries to limit their purchases and to increase their sales at any cost, even by dramatically diminishing the domestic supply.

The principal effect of these outside influences is without any doubt the renewal of interest of the member countries of CEMA for their own economic integration and their international socialist division of labor. "CEMA is still the privileged place for trade." Could that imply for the future a slowing down in East-West economic relations? Difficult to state. No doubt nothing yet permits us to declare this in a peremptory way. And however, since 1976 it is impossible not to observe the weakening of the growth in East-West trade.

Has it been caused by the world economic recession since 1974-1975? Marie Lavigne very justly considers that without wanting to minimize its effect, first of all it is necessary to look for internal explanations. It is their own economy that the Eastern countries must heal, or rather reform.

And this is where the new edition of her work on "The Soviet and European Socialist Economies" 10 years after the first publication can be of great help. Ten years during which three more characteristic phenomena have been manifested in the socialist economies: a slowing of economic growth, inflationary tensions and a deterioration in the balance of payments.

The mean annual rate of growth of the net material product (national revenue) of the European socialist countries as a whole declined from 7.4 percent in 1966-1970 to 6.1 percent in 1971-1975 and according to the Plan should reach 5.3 percent but in 1976 the overall rate was 5.2 percent; in 1977 4.2 percent and in 1978 4.3 percent. This slowdown, not only observed but planned, has internal structural causes; low labor productivity, tied in large part to a systematic policy of full employment on the macroeconomic level, joined to inefficiencies in management which economic reforms have not been able to eliminate; an incapacity to expand technical progress inside the economy because of the hiatus between research and development and mass production and the chronic weakness of the agricultural sector. An escalation of problems for which the author analyses both the structural roots of the sickness and the remedies administered for 10 to 15 years.

The second phenomenon which differentiates the recent period from the 60's is the pressure, open or repressed, of inflationary tensions, of varying degrees according to the country. Its causes are both external (increases in world prices causing a deterioration in exchange rates in the small countries and a growing deficit in the balance of payments) and internal (excessively "tight" planning, imbalances in the labor market, a swelling of stock-piles and unfinished investments, an imbalance between supply and demand both on the level of enterprises and of households, whose incomes are permanently greater than the goods and services offered).

The corrective policies--a more decisive role for credit, a direct limitation on investments, indexing wage increases on an increase in productivity, in short a reinforcement of central planning--have had the effect of adhesive tape and the socialist economies, imitating the West, "must get used to living with inflation."

Finally, the increase in foreign indebtedness is the third relatively recent element: a complex phenomenon born of the modernization policies of the key sectors of those countries (large purchases of Western technology), of the great vulnerability of socialist agriculture to bad weather (massive purchases of cereals), of the rarity of exportable sophisticated products (canned crab figures more importantly than machines in the exports of the USSR to France!) and also of the world-wide inflation.

In another key, it can be asked if it is not necessary to classify as a significant phenomonon for this decade the increase in the economic delinquency which affects all those countries in spite of the vigor of controls and repression. This fact is to be compared to the fantastic extension of the "parallel" economy (black market) and the multiplication of its forms. Marie

Lavigne was wondering 10 years ago about the reasons for the absence of a collective conscience sensible to the moral value of "social ownership of the means of production." In the new edition, she explains the generalization of certain economic offenses with a contradiction--studded with examples--which exists "between the social objectives of the economic policy and the insufficient means for putting them into practice." In spite of everything, Marie Lavigne still wonders if it is not a question of "gangs with the spirit of capitalism": a rather paradoxical question! The other hypothesis that she envisages--the poor share of the workers which makes them indifferent to protecting public property--is without a doubt more plausible.

What is the attitude of the leaders faced with these phenomena? An imitation of the Western governments: "to take measures." What are their effects? Less than hoped for! Three great tendencies deserve to be pointed out, which in the long run seem to us to be the most pregnant with consequences: the increase in centralization, benevolence with regard to the private sector and, on the international level, a tightening of the economic bonds among the member countries of CEMA. It is a question of general tendencies which must not make us forget that each country has characteristics which are proper to it and that consequently it undertakes whatever policy of economic consolidation seems appropriate to it.

The almost general tendency toward centralization during the last 10 years has been shown in all the countries (with the exception of Hungary) by a strengthening of the Central Plan and the central organs of economic administration, going hand in hand with the extension of the great economic organizations and industrial concentration. As an example, the Soviet Constitution of 7 October 1977 consecrated the combination of "centralized management (and) the economic autonomy and initiative of the enterprises, unions and other organizations," but the autonomy of the enterprises is more restricted when compared with the situation in 1965. And the very last dispositions decreed by the USSR in July 1979 which Marie Lavigne has been able to include in her work orient the Soviet economic system toward a much more centralized and authoritative scheme.

All these measures, "reforms," new mechanisms applied since the reforms were begun 10 or 15 years ago, aim in fact at struggling against the stagnation of labor productivity together with poor quality in production, badly adapted to the demand of the users or consumers; in other words, against a bogging down from which they are unable to extricate themselves.

The second trait which can be observed in most of those countries is the relative benevolence of the authorities with regard to the private sector. Chiefly in Hungary and in Poland, that attitude can be explained by the underdevelopment of the service sector. The fiscal and social legislation adopted in those two countries in 1977 must have given it a new life. In the USSR private activities have been authorized by decree since 1976..."excluding those which are forbidden by the same text." The content of that text--it is to be inferred--is not very well enforced. In the agricultural domain, the

official policy has also been clearly oriented toward support of the private sector, whose contribution to agricultural production is not negligible: 1/3 of the total agricultural production in Hungary, 38 percent in Bulgaria, 11 percent in Czechoslovakia....

Finally, the third tendency which has been manifested for several years is the tightening of the bonds between the CEMA countries on the macroeconomic level, in spite of the deficiencies of their community financial and monetary system. The CEMA organization has been noticeably enlarged on the institutional level. Since 1971 its activity has been guided by a program of economic, commercial, scientific, monetary and industrial cooperation. Since 1976-1975 the integration of production has been developed along two lines: the adoption of concerted plans for "multilateral integration measures" which express the commitments of all those countries toward carrying out a small number of large projects (chiefly for the exploitation of energy resources), and the adoption of "common finished programs" on the long term which will establish the great features of development of the large economic branches. Concerted plans and finished programs are supported by scientific, technical and industrial cooperation.

It can be regretted that the book "The Soviet and European Socialist Economies" has so pronounced a didactic character; but it is a manual and from that point of view it is invaluable. Moreover, according to the varied terms of the author, "economic studies on the socialist countries" (and her book is one of them) suffer from a double original infirmity: they are "descriptive (...) and institutional." Having stated that, as she wonders about the future of the "existing socialisms" and on their journey toward a "real" socialism, Marie Lavigne usefully invites us to mediate on the possible ways to perfection of those systems, now alined--as the capitalist regimes are too--against the challenge of the Third World.

German-Soviet Relations

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French No 7 Spring 80 pp 249-251

[Branko Lazitch review of "The Soviet Union and the Germanies," Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979]

[Text] The Soviet leaders know that their state, in its condition as a superpower, must as a priority oppose three countries, but on three different levels: on the planetary level, the United States of America; on the Asiatic level, the People's Republic of China; and on the European level, Germany. Their confrontation with the United States has been a fact since 1945: their litigations with China burst out publicly in 1960; but the problems with Germany began with the very birth of Soviet Russia. All of Moscow's vital decisions on questions of international relations up to the end of World War II have always been connected with the German problem, from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 to the surrender of 8 May 1945, passing through

diplomatic treaties of capital importance like the Rapallo Treaty in 1922 or the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939. Has the German problem lost any importance in the 35 years since the end of World War II? The answer is to be found in Mrs Renata Fritsch-Bournazel's book, a substantial answer which fully confirms the Germany's fundamental position for the Kremlin's policy in Europe. When the three great powers met in Potsdam from 17 July to 2 August 1945 Germany no longer existed; but nevertheless it was still problem number one of that conference. From that moment Germany suffered the hazards of the relations among the Allies--which were in the process of becoming adversaries. The misunderstandings began immediately: the decisions at Potsdam speak of an eventual reconstruction of German political life "on a democratic and peaceful basis." A short time afterward the Germans were to realize that those words do not carry the same meaning in Moscow as they do in Washington. The German Communists, those who had escaped Stalin's purges, returned to Eastern Germany and in their turn they recognized that Stalin--without consulting them--had decided on the policy which their country was to follow. Thus, when Anton Ackermann, spokesman of the "Ulbricht Group," published an article on 1 December 1945 in the first number of a German Communist magazine, he pleaded for the "Sonderweg"--the specifically German road to socialism. That idea was not followed up and the author himself, after he made his self-criticism, fell into disgrace. And it was precisely in the zone of occupation of the Red Army in Eastern Germany that for the first time after 1946 a formal order was imposed by Moscow, which then became obligatory for all the countries located behind the Iron Curtain: the unification of the communists and the socialists in a single party.

However, Stalin used a certain prudence in beginning the steps toward the Sovietization of Eastern Germany. When he had the Cominform founded in September 1947, all the communist parties of Eastern and Central Europe were involved, except the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany). When CEMA--the economic community of the socialist countries--was created in January 1949, the GDR had not seen the light of day; but when it was born, it was necessary for it to wait one more year before being admitted into that assemblage of disciples.

The reason for that prudence was simple: at that time, the balance of power was not leaning toward Moscow. A few daring initiatives by the Soviet bloc even provoked some Western reactions, like the Berlin Airlift in 1948 and the military intervention against North Korean aggression in 1950. That was why Stalin avoided a firm commitment with regard to Eastern Germany: from 1945 to 1948 he signed a "treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with all the countries of Eastern and Central Europe but not with the "democratic" Germany, which he was not to carry to the baptismal fount until 1949.

Since then, Moscow has made up for lost time and the integration of the GDR into the Soviet system has not ceased to be accentuated. The first Soviet-GDR treaty was signed in the autumn of 1955; but the real "treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation" dates from June of 1964, only a few months before the fall of Khrushchev. Today the belt has been buckled; the constitution of the GDR, which went into effect in 1974, proclaims: "the

GDR is forever and irrevocably allied with the Soviet Union." A decisive step was taken the following year with the signing on 7 October 1975 of a new Soviet-GDR treaty. As Mrs Fritsch-Bournazel writes: "On that day the leaders of the party and of the government were not in East Berlin to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the founding of the GDR but were in Moscow to sign a treaty that no event made necessary." Certainly, no occurrence required the signing of that document but the putting into effect of the Brezhnev Doctrine made it opportune. According to Article 4 of the treaty, the USSR and the GDR declare themselves disposed to take "all necessary measures to defend and preserve the historic conquest of socialism." And the article that follows, devoted to reciprocal assistance, completes that graft on the Brezhnev Doctrine because, as the author writes, it does not contain "any geographical limitation and does not refer to the Warsaw Pact either."

If prudence characterized the Kremlin's policy toward the GDR in the beginning, it was rather patience which inspired its policy with regard to the FRG. The author points out that the theory of the two German states was formulated by Moscow in 1955 and that, the same year, Chancellor Adenauer paid a visit to Khrushchev. But it was only 15 years later, on 12 August 1970, that the treaty between the USSR and the FRG was signed in Moscow. It is a relatively short treaty, composed of a preamble and five articles. Article 2 stipulates: with the goal "of encouraging the normalization of the situation in Europe," the two signatories commit themselves to exclude from their relations any recourse to force. Two years later, in November 1972, a "treaty on the bases of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic" was initialed. Mrs Fritsch-Bournazel observes on this subject: "After having been placed under the ban of the international community for nearly a quarter of a century, the GDR saw itself finally recognized by Bonn as an equal state and sovereign by right."

This treaty is part of the policy of detente between the two Germanys and also between the two world superpowers. This detente brings to both Germanys great possibilities for the exchange of goods, new facilities for the exchange of persons, but no opening for the exchange of ideas. It also brings certain illusions, in particular those which concern the two salutary effects of trade with the USSR. The first effect: peace ("East-West Trade"--according to Chancellor Schmidt--"provides an important instrument for guaranteeing peace"; (p 243). The second effect: the evolution of the Soviet system in conformity with the German formula "Wandel durch Handel" ("change through trade"). A thesis based on "wishful thinking"; it is neither original, as it was formulated at the time of the NEP [New Economic Policy] (1921); nor exact, since historical experience regularly gives it the lie.

In one word: Mrs Fritsch-Bournazel's work is from now on indispensable both to know the past of Soviet-German relations and to understand the current policy of the Moscow-Pankow-Bonn triangle.

12,116
CSO: 3100

NEW EC PRESIDENT THORN'S LINE ANALYZED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 2 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Sytze van der Zee: "Gaston Thorn, a Left of Center Liberal"]

[Text] Brussels, 2 July--The new president of the European Commission is Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg's minister of foreign affairs. This is now a fact, although it still is not clear when he will be formally appointed. In fact, the government leaders in the community have the last word here, but the next European Council is only around the end of 1980. Therefore appointing Gaston Thorn on 22 July during an EC Council of Ministers in Brussels is being considered.

However, all problems are not solved thereby, for at that time Thorn would be both candidate-president as well as chairman of the EC Council of Ministers. Yesterday Luxembourg took over the chairmanship of the EC for the next half year, specifically from Italy. But most of the EC countries are of the opinion that both positions should not be combined, at least if Thorn wants to be seriously considered as a candidate.

For the intention is that he look for possible candidates for the new commission in the next 6 months--the old one is resigning on 1 January 1981--and get an idea of what he wants to do in Brussels. The second question is whether the member states want to listen to his advice, because they, for the most part, have their own ideas about whom they want to push forward for the commission. It is not excluded that Thorn will soon resign as minister of foreign affairs and will devote himself only to the preparatory work for Brussels.

For that purpose, he will have to visit all European capitals to sound out candidates and find out in conversations with the

governments involved what is politically attainable. It can be assumed that the contact with French president Giscard d'Estaing will be somewhat stiff, since the latter suddenly objected to Thorn's appointment last month during the European Council.

All kinds of reasons were given for this, but the real reason is that all the French oppose too strong a commission president. A man with political ideas and energy such as the small 51 year old Luxembourger, does not suit them at all. Although the French meanwhile have taken back their objection, their attitude must still be a disappointment for Thorn. For years he operated with the idea he had very good relations with Giscard as well as FRG Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. However they dropped him like a stone in Venice, even Schmidt.

Thorn himself has been active in politics since 1959, after he had studied law at Montpelier, Lausanne and Paris. He belonged to the Luxembourg Liberal Party, for which he immediately obtained a seat in the European Parliament. There follows in 1969 his appointment as minister of foreign affairs and foreign commerce, public works as well as physical culture and sports; 3 years later he took over the leadership of a coalition government of liberals and socialists. He remained "government president," as the Luxembourgers call the prime minister, until 1979.

But besides on the national level, Thorn has always been very active in European politics. In 1970 he was elected chairman of the Liberal International. He now has been for years the head of the European Liberal Democrats, which formerly were called the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties in the EC.

His own Liberal Democratic Party is just somewhat left of center in the spectrum and probably has more in common with D'66 [Democrats '66] than with the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy].

Thorn said last year about this: "Our sister party, with which we have cooperated from the beginning, is the VVD. I will not hide the fact that it is to the right of us and is more conservative than the Luxembourg liberals. But although we perhaps are closer to D'66 which claims to be a progressive party, that does not change at all our traditional bonds and cooperation with the VVD. Rather the contrary is the case." In this connection, he condemns D'66 intolerance of the VVD.

Ambitious Project

However Thorn had to retire from the field as prime minister last year, since his socialist coalition partner suffered a severe election defeat. Thorn was also to blame for this himself. The Socialists namely were held responsible for an extremely ambitious project which Thorn was contemplating with his eye on the new European parliament. He wanted to build a huge complex for 165 million guilders, "Center 300," in which the parliament would have been housed. An uproar was created, when the plan leaked out. Luxembourg newspapers called Thorn a megalomaniac.

For opponents had estimated that the project would cost at least 500 million guilders. After violent parliamentary debates, Thorn decided to give up the project. In so doing, he was still able to save his own neck, but the socialists had to foot the bill, since many Luxembourgers took the attitude that they had allowed themselves to be a doormat. A new liberal-socialist coalition was no longer possible, so Thorn decided to have a try at the chairmanship of the new European Parliament.

However, he got the worst of it against French President Giscard d'Estaing's protegee, Simone Veil. Therefore, in expectation of better times, he accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs in the coalition government of the christian democrat, Werner. At the same time, he became deputy prime minister, but it was then already apparent that this position was only of a temporary nature. Gaston Thorn wanted to go higher up, outside of Luxembourg, where for him there were no more honors to be obtained. Whether he will succeed in that in the EC is very doubtful.

8490
CSO: 3105

PARTICIPATION IN PROTESTS AT MOSCOW OLYMPICS

AU1109Q8 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 11 Jul 80 pp 1-2

[Excerpts] Vienna--Late, but still in time the Austrian Olympic Committee and its President, Bundesrat Deputy Kurt Heller, have come to the decision that Austria's representatives at the 22d Olympic Summer Games in Moscow will not carry out any protest actions. This attitude is to be welcomed, Austrian Communist Party chairman Franz Muhri declared, because such protest actions are all the less justified after the positive course of the talks between Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Schmidt. They do not constitute any positive contribution toward solving the Afghanistan question, either, Muhri declared.

When on 19 May the Austrian Olympic Committee decided with a vote of 37 to 9 in favor of participating in the Moscow summer games, certain circles in Austria and abroad persisted in urging protest actions during the games. Thus the traditional parade of the athletes with their national flag at the opening ceremony was to be boycotted, and there were to be no national flags or anthems at medal-awarding ceremonies. A conference in Paris, in which the Western National Olympic Committees participated, again did not bring the desired success: Denmark, Greece and Austria put off their final decision.

On Thursday morning [10 July] it was finally decided, however, that Austria would not carry out any protest actions. "For neutral Austria it is very difficult to make gestures of disapproval of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan," Heller declared in an interview. He added that the athletes themselves were all in favor of participating in the opening ceremony and of having the national anthem played and the national flag shown at medal-awarding ceremonies. "We were not given any instructions by the Austrian Government, but it did advise us to be cautious in making our decision," Heller declared in conclusion.

People's Party [OEVP] sports spokesman Hoechtl--as was to be expected--had brushed aside the Olympic Committee's decision and its motivation and, in an OEVP press release, he again pleads for a protest action in Moscow.

CSO: 3103

BRIEFS

SENEGAL CLOSES VIENNA EMBASSY--Economic difficulties compel Senegal to close its embassy in Vienna, which was set up only 3 years ago. On 2 July Foreign Minister Pahr gave a reception for outgoing Senegalese Ambassador Col Claude Madembasy, who will continue to represent his country at the UNIDO and at the Atomic Energy Agency, however, and is thus expected to return frequently to Vienna. [AU031250 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 3 Jul 80 p 2]

VOEST TO BUILD NEW SUPERGUN--The Liezen Works of the Voest Steel Corporation plans to produce a 155-millimeter gun, under a license agreement with a Canadian firm. First tests with the new gun, which will cost 12-15 million schillings apiece, have given excellent results. The company is hoping to be able to export the new gun as well as ammunition to non-belligerent Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. [AU031250 Vienna KURIER in German 3 Jul 80 p 7]

CELLULOSE PLANT FOR CSSR--The Austrian Andritz Machine Company has obtained a 4-billion schilling CSSR order to build a cellulose plant in Paskov. The Austrian company will act as the main contractor, with a 20 percent share going to the French Creusset-Loire Company as a subcontractor. The project will be financed by the Austrian Credit-Anstalt bank. [Vienna KURIER in German 4 Jul 80 p 6]

AUSTRIAN SHIPS FOR USSR--After the USSR Ambassador in Austria recently declared at a ship-launching ceremony in Korneuburg that the USSR intends to have a large number of various ships built in Austria, the Korneuburg shipyard management is confident that it will succeed in obtaining orders for a large share of the ships needed by the Soviet Union. There are reportedly 30 river passenger boats, 10-15 dry cargo boats, and 80 tug and tow units. [Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5-6 Jul 80 p 9]

AUSTRIAN TOURISTS VISIT HUNGARY--In 1979, the number of Austrian tourists visiting Hungary went up 50 percent, to 900,000. This increase is mainly a result of the abolition of visas. Hungarian authorities expect a further increase in the number of Austrian tourists this year. Border crossing procedures are to be reformed this year with a view to shortening waiting periods at the border. [Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5-6 Jul 80 p 9]

CSO: 3103

DISHARMONY PREVAILS AT GREEN PARTY CONGRESS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 30 Jun 80 pp 83-85

[Article: "Important Mood"]

[Text] The election congress of the Greens did not lead to a split, but the formation of splinter groups weakened the movement which wants to take away decisive electoral percentages from the established Bonn parties in October.

Olaf Dinne, Green city parliament deputy from Bremen, saw only red during the Greens' federal congress.

"The Greens assembled here are sick and tired of the constant squabbling with the communist cadre squads," the deputy stated Sunday before last before 50 likeminded people in the Dortmund Westfalenhalle Hotel while the approximately 900 delegates were still holding their congress in a nearby hall.

And organic farmer Baldur Springmann, spokesman of the Ecological Working Group, took a quite similar view, saying: "The party evidently is unable to become conscious of its ecological basis."

"That means that very sad conclusions have to be drawn," Springmann said. And last week he put into effect what he had forecast already on the eve of the party congress, when he said, "If the delegates do not stick to our ideas, we will leave the organization."

It was still not the split that had been predicted for every meeting of the Greens, including the one in Dortmund, but there is no doubt that the environmental party was in trouble at its election party congress. And it is now no longer clear whether the Greens, who until recently still looked like a serious threat to the established parties in Bonn and above all to the Social Democrats, would have the stamina required until October.

As many as three figureheads, each in his own way attractive to certain groups of voters, went under in Dortmund. Instead of Herbert Gruhl, a former CDU Bundestag deputy, the leftist trade unionist Dieter Burgmann joined the executive. August Haussleiter, who had brought his "Action Association of Independent Germans" (AUD) into the Green movement, thus enriching it by a shiny addition, resigned his post on the executive. And Baldur Springmann, spokesman of the Schleswig-Holstein ecologists, quit the party.

The delegates also did not want the federal treasurer, Grete Thomas, to hold her office any longer; she had put a detective on the trail of her Lower Saxon party rival Helmut Lippelt to find out about his financial position.

The Greens, who after all are already represented in two Land parliaments and in several municipal councils, nevertheless want to compete in the big election in October. Whether in unison is not yet clear. For the moment, the Greens of Bremen, represented in the city parliament since last fall, are demurring: Gruhl still wants to consult with his supporters of the "Green Future Action" (GAZ). And Springmann's ecologists too have asked for time to think things over.

"The supporters of clear conditions" (Springmann) had made maximum demands right at the start of the Dortmund congress, saying that because of its "leftist liability" the Saarbruecken basic program must be reduced to the status of "not binding discussion material" and that the three-headed federal executive must resign in a body--to insure the election of Herbert Gruhl to the executive.

Above all, the orthodox ecologists' front around Springmann and Dinne did not like the Saarbruecken theses concerning the economic and social program. The delegates, it happened, had not only limited themselves to such standard demands as a 35-hour week but, for instance, had also pleaded for a ban against lockouts and come out against "blacklists and snooping in plants by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution."

The delegates in Dortmund, however, were not prepared again to discuss fundamental issues. Interpreting the rejection of his proposals as a takeover by "dogmatic Marxist cadres," Springmann gave up. And the Gruhl group was not able either to prevail with its particular green color.

Gruhl, however, primarily had himself to blame for failing to be elected to the executive. Thus North Rhine-Westphalian delegates blamed him for "not having lifted a finger" in the Landtag election campaign in the most populous FRG Land. Nor did his constant threats to resign make any impression on the delegates any longer. "The regularity with which Gruhl does so is not particularly to the liking of the basis democrats," said a delegate from the Main-Kinzig district, expressing the distaste of the majority.

Berlin attorney Otto Schily regretted that Gruhl, "who represents an important mood of the Greens, is not also represented in public by occupying a seat on the executive," but even this role did not make the former Christian Democrat, who lacks persuasive power and a fine tactical sense, electable in the eyes of the Dortmund congress. Finally Schily too said that the man of "sullen charm" (as the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE called him) had a "certain gift for invariably finding the wrong way of talking to the delegates in any important situation."

To find the right tone, though, is not easy among the Greens after the Dortmund purge either. "What distinguishes us from the other parties," says a delegate from Baden-Wuerttemberg, "is our EVI, our unity in diversity [Einheit in der Vielfalt]."

Diversity is guaranteed by groups such as the Achberg circle from Ravensburg--primarily proponents of anthroposophy--or people around Springmann who, as one Green puts it, "can hardly see above their unsprayed potato perspective." Gruhl's GAZ behaves rather conservatively, entering occasionally into alliances with the "Free International College" of Duesseldorf artist Beuys.

The left is checkered as well. There is the "Z" group, which has been excluded from the Communist League (KB) because of "rightist deviation," there are people who used to belong to the West German Communist League, and occasionally one can also find a former member of the Mao KPD. Supporters of communist groups, however, probably do not amount to even 10 percent of delegate votes. The rest of the trends is recruited from among undogmatic leftists.

The various wings did manage a clear majority in electing a new chairman--41 year-old Dieter Burgmann, a leftwing trade unionist from the Metalworkers Union. The Greens are hoping that he will get votes away from the SPD party base.

Former Juso [Young Socialist] Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, a Green Baden-Wuerttemberg Landtag deputy, could not detect a move to the left at the Dortmund party congress. He had no doubt either, however, that there still were "conflicts" which the delegates had to remove.

How this could be done by October was made clear by his fellow delegate Winfried Kretschmann: "We must develop the big-hearted Green, not the small-hearted German element. We must not take ourselves too seriously."

The chances are that the new movement is no longer being taken all that seriously either by the established parties, though SPD Bundestag candidate Freimut Duve of Hamburg warns against drawing the wrong conclusions, saying, "Let no one think that internal squabbling in that chaotic bunch has put an end to our environmental problems."

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CSO: 3103

ROLE OF DECLINING SWEDISH PEOPLE'S PARTY WEIGHED

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 31 May 80 p 17

[Article by Matti Saari: "It Is Dangerously Quiet in Swedish People's Party, Par Stenback's Thoughts Before Party Congress"]

[Text] The Swedish People's Party is an ideological battlefield. It is a party which is part of the standard composition of the government, but still by nature more of a people's movement.

The RKP [Swedish People's Party] is supported by 75 percent of Finland's Swedish-speaking population. Approximately 4 percent of its constituency can be called Finnish speaking. The party will never become large. This is for certain.

These facts are also recognized by Party Chairman and Education Minister Par Stenback. In his opinion it has been dangerously calm in the party for the last few years. Entirely too quiet.

Par Stenback is the indisputable leader of the party.

In Loviisa he will be elected as chairman of the RKP for the fourth time in the beginning of June. No one has as yet seriously threatened his position as chairman.

The fact that Stenback is assured of his position in the election in Loviisa fits the picture very well. On the island of Hastholmen in Loviisa there is an atomic power plant, whose second operational phase was recently granted approval in the government.

Before Stenback became chairman of the RKP and a government minister he struggled fiercely on behalf of environmental protection and against Neste's oil refineries.

At that time he was a young radical whose examples are deeply rooted in Nordic and Finnish-Swedish liberalism. A kind of liberalism that the Liberal People's Party has seldom achieved in spite of its name.

There are many representatives of this kind of liberalism among Finland's Swedish-speaking people.

Jan-Magnus Jansson is the chief editor of HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, a former minister, and a person with a continuing influence. This group also includes scientists: Westermark, Lagerberg, and Allardt.

There is also Stenback's predecessor, C. O. Tallgren. And many more.

And even though Stenback does not mention them by name within earshot of the Finnish-speaking majority, Donner, Tikkanen, and Kihlman also represent this tradition. Indeed they are not among those who support the RKP.

However, they have all left their mark on Finnish culture and philosophy.

One of Stenback's marks is the Nyliberala Student Forbundet.

It was established during the years of contradiction in the 1930's. Student demonstrations in the spring of 1968 brought an end to it.

A kind of continuation to this organization was recently established in Helsinki under the name of Liberalt Forum, which in the manner of Stenback is seeking contacts with the liberal parties of other Nordic countries.

However, what is most essential is that Par Stenback is no longer the young radical, but a minister.

The chief editor of STUDENTBLADET, the director of the YLE, and the editor of ULKOPOLITIIKKA, and so on. They are of the past, but the list of credits of a politician is always long.

In spite of this, Stenback continues to give the appearance of being a young man. He does not suffer from stress. And when he is in the mood, he can be very humerous.

He does not at all give the impression of a typical Swedish-speaking landowner of the upper class from the vicinity of Ruuki.

However, he has a responsible position as a promoter of culture since he directs the Hanasaari Cultural Center.

He is also a realist. Being bound to old traditions he did not vote on the license for the Loviisa Power Plant, but noted his point of view in the official records in a civilized manner.

Many others have followed in this same tradition.

I Do Not Intend to Refuse in the Near Future

"When I was elected for the first time, I promised that I would be chairman longer than my predecessors."

Kristian Gestrin was chairman for 1 year, and C. O. Tallgren was chairman for 3 years.

When Stenback was elected chairman for the first time, Goran von Bonsdorf represented the opposition. No opposition has been seen in this form since 1977.

"The last party congress demonstrated that there is no opposition even in name. This is dangerous... We have become accustomed to a free exchange of opinions... I would not be surprised if we were to now encounter the first signs that we do not want to continue to maintain the impression that everything is going well..."

On the Average, In the Center

Par Stenback is as far as his positions are concerned much closer to the center than the great majority of his party's supporters.

Thus the RKP is "on the average" a centrist party. This is also underscored by Stenback.

"We practice a policy by which we are equated with the center, but there continues to be various directions of thought in the party... It cannot be said that we are ideologically a pure center party. We are a general bourgeois party. This is also beneficial to the RKP.

"We have the habit of conceitedly saying that those syntheses which eventually occur in the government were perceived by us in advance since we have made the same decisions in our own party."

Stenback willingly relates how 27 percent of the party's supporters belong to the working class. As a result of this, the strongest opponent in elections is the SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party]. The SDP is also in a special position for the reason that its Swedish-speaking organization has four Diet members.

However, Stenback is optimistic about the results of this struggle since "many older supporters of the workers' movement have begun to return to the ranks of the RKP".

But even though the RKP has more supporters among the working class than other bourgeois parties, it also has a strong upperclass tradition.

But: we have only a small disparity between the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking social groups even though many believe that we are all of the upper class.

"Naturally, we have a certain cultural heritage and economic legacy, which have been handed down to us."

And this legacy has its guardian in those institutions which support the RKP. Also an influential representative of the opposition sits in the RKP's Diet faction. Ingvar S. Melin also holds a position in the headquarters of the STK (Finnish Employers Association) in Etelaranta. But there are also many fishermen, blue-collar workers, tomato growers, and mink farmers.

A People's Movement

We are a people's movement, which unites cultural organizations, youth organizations, church and religious groups, and nearly all aspects of human life.

"We are the political representative of all of them. This, naturally, places many restrictions on us, but also provides many opportunities for action."

One of these opportunities is economic support.

And as a consequence of all this, the RKP is "more of an organization promoting the interests of the Swedish-speaking people than a political party."

And when the interests and ideologies of all the interest groups are calculated together with the balance of power in Finnish society, one can come to the conclusion that the interest policies of the RKP fall into the political center. This also has the added benefit that the probability of entering the government is better.

And in the government one can also affect minority issues. This is the central goal of the RKP.

"The RKP is not an end in itself. When one considers that it is possible to get along OK without it... But as long as 75 percent of Finland's Swedes support us, we do not feel that we are unnecessary."

In many ways the RKP is a unique phenomenon in Europe even though there are many kinds of minorities.

"The RKP is the only party based on a linguistic group -- except for Belgium perhaps -- which has a political platform in the parliament as well as the government."

A Favorable Government

The low-profile government led by Mauno Koivisto has been a good government for the RKP. The low profile fits in well with the average interests of the RKP, and a centrist majority has guaranteed the implementation of laws and issues.

An important issue for the RKP during this government has been that the Radio Committee has approved the construction of a third Swedish-language TV-network.

"This new channel is important from the point of view of the whole Finnish-Swedish culture. Nordsat would not have been any kind of a solution for us. We do not want Swedish-language Swedish programming, but Swedish-language Finnish programming.

"In Pohjanmaa there is a large group of people who know about Sweden's social conditions better than Finland's as a result of television programs coming from across the border. This is a serious problem for us and for all of society since we are become estranged from the rest of the Finnish-speaking society."

In tenback's opinion bilingualism no longer works well in Finland. Many Swedish-speaking people are emigrating to Sweden.

In Stenback's opinion we need institutions and solutions which will guarantee living space for bilingualism and Finland's Swedish culture.

In spite of the third TV channel, Stenback considers that the whole government suffers from the government's low profile.

"The government is carrying out a cotton policy. An operational method has not been found for this government by which it could accomplish quick agreements. The decisionmaking process is like drinking tar...

"The SDP is clearly dissatisfied with its own role in the government. It seems to me that the SDP's dissatisfaction is not just the result of the centrist parties, but also of other reasons. Koivisto has told me a couple times that everything is now completely different than in his previous government. He has nostalgically said that everything went more smoothly then and that the prime minister's job was easier."

During Koivisto's previous government, there was a leftist majority, now it is a centrist majority.

"This change, perhaps, has not been given sufficient publicity.

"I am not among those who emphasize this. This fact is to be carefully used in the background. It is not an everyday procedure in the use of pow..

"Perhaps it is so that Sorsa and Virolainen found a kind of common tune in the government. It was indeed a more brutal way of handling the patterns of government. I have heard it said that at that time bilateral agreements w... made and kept.

"On the other hand, it was not a very good time for the other parties."

We Dot Expect Much Fr m Life

The position of opposition during the previous government pacified the internal conflicts of the RKP. Stenback describes life in the RKP as peaceful.

"We do not expect much from life... We do not expect vast numbers of supporters... We do not live in tense expectations of Gallup Poll results... If someone says that our support has decreased or increased 0.2 percent, we laugh... We ourselves know the truth."

The Peaceful Swedes

Since Mauno Koivisto's government will be in power when the RKP begins its party congress, it is not expected that there will be an animated exchange of opinions on overall policy.

Also the outcome of the chairmanship positions is clear.

The present system of four chairmen ensures that the various wings of the party such as the farmers, centrists, the rightwing, and the Finnish-speaking members as small minorities will have a place in the party's leadership.

The RKP has even otherwise had an appeal for bilingual Finns, which is attested to by the election of Hirsihangas at the last party congress. From the point of view of the RKP bilingual people and people whose mother tongue is Swedish are in the greatest danger when they marry with Finns.

The Environment and Fishermen

The initiatives presented to the party congress give a clear picture of what will be the most probable subjects of general discussion providing that there is no government crisis in the country.

The initiatives oppose, among other things, nuclear technology, participation in Libya's nuclear power project, and uranium mining in Kittila.

Those who compiled the initiatives are also concerned about the rivers in Pohjanmaa, Neste's plans for a new water channel (Houskari fishermen) and the prevention of oil spills.

The women's organization of the party is also concerned about the rights of foreigners.

Stable Support

In the last decade RKP support has fluctuated very little. In the local elections of 1972 the party received 5.2 percent of the vote and in the local elections of 1976 4.7 percent.

In the most recent opinion poll RKP support fluctuated between 3.9 and 4.8 percent.

When the percentage figures concerning the RKP obtained in the opinion polls are interpreted, it is argued whether Ahvenanmaa (Aland Archipelago) has been taken into consideration in the results. Even in the Aland Islands there has been a process of change, which has made the political map more uniform in comparison with the mainland, but the Diet member from the Aland Islands can still definitely be counted in the ranks of the RKP.

10576
CSO: 3107

CHRISTIAN LEAGUE SLOWLY ADOPTS 'ORDINARY PARTY' POSTURE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 1 Jun 80 p 12

[Article by Timo Lipponen: "Minor Dispute in Forthcoming Party Congress, Christian League Leadership Lacking a Clergyman"]

[Text] Secularization does not at this time threaten the Finnish Christian League. The party congress to be held next Friday and Saturday will be blessed by the old leadership and will precisely define the content of basic Christian values with next fall's local elections in mind.

However, it has been noted among the rank and file that there is no clergyman in the party's leadership. The man promoting this matter is Diet Member Antero Juntumaa, who has been considered as a possible candidate. Chairman Raino Westerholm does not consider clergy representation to be necessary.

During its whole existence the SKL [Finnish Christian League] has influenced policy through an opposition which it has used as a conscience for other parties. This opposition line reached its apex in the electoral elections of 1978 when 215,244 Finns wanted Raino Westerholm as their next president.

In the eyes of the parties supporting Kekkonen the honor of the Christian League was lost completely -- but its reputation grew.

In the confusion of the election campaign the father of the country banished the Christian League into an extreme rightwing corner. This period of penitance, which was called the long wandering in the wilderness, left the SKL in the political shadows more than ever before. The party was favored but avoided.

Now the namesake party of a Christian people has an opportunity to double its support. Only after this would the enticement of voters result in an abandonment of current principles.

In the opinion of Chairman Raino Westerholm raising support from just under 5 percent to around 10 percent will guarantee the party's perceptible effect on our country's social development.

"Kekkonen Channeled Opposition Votes"

Presidential candidate Urho Kekkonen's speech in Mikkeli in the fall of 1977 agitated Christian League supporters. Chairman Westerholm continues to be of the opinion that the criticism directed against them by Kekkonen was only a matter of politics.

"Labeling - us as extreme rightwing had a completely contrary effect from the point of view of the intent of the speech. It helped us to gain an election victory," he s tes.

Raino Westerholm also states that he heard a version according to which the President wanted to channel opposition votes to the Christian candidate. Indeed, Westerholm was the "heaviest" candidate and as far as foreign policy is concerned perhaps the purest.

"When we visited with the President in connection with government negotiations at Tamminiemi, the president expressed great interest in our party. He wanted to hear our thoughts. I was under the understanding that the conflict between us and the highest political leadership are not insurmountable, recalled Westerholm.

However, the other parties took Kekkonen's previous complaint quite seriously. Only Counselor of State Martti Miettunen has publicly supported the Christian League in the government.

Those Not Affiliated with the Church Have Strong Representation

The party's chairman describes himself as an average Christian, who does not feel any attraction to any particular faction.

However, the party's second chairman (Vice Chairman) Ilmari Nelimaki is a pentecostal and Party Secretary Reko Almgren is a congregationalist, who has sat on the board of the Finnish Congregational Church for many years.

"The majority of our supporters have church affiliation. In addition, cooperation in the party's leadership and between those among the rank and file who are church affiliated and not affiliated is extremely good. If small conflicts have appeared, they are the result of personality questions and not questions of faith," emphasizes Westerholm.

He presumes that political competitors are attempting to shatter their unity. Defections to other parties have occurred only in Kuopio where a delegate went over to the Agrarian Party.

"The fact that our pentecostal member of the Diet, Ulla Jarvilehto, has frequently been invited to religious events is evidence of an atmosphere lacking of conflict."

Antero Juntumaa Thinks Differently

Diet Member Antero Juntumaa, a chaplain from Orivesi, is among the dissidents in the SKL's chairmanship question. Even Westerholm describes him by saying "Juntumaa is das ding an sich" -- an event in itself.

"I have presented the idea that there should be a member of the clergy in the chairmanship position -- a woman theologian would be alright," proposes Juntumaa.

He has also supported competing candidates for the chairmanship position, but Westerholm has a secure internal position and Juntumaa has not wanted to make this position questionable.

But would you yourself agree to be a vice chairman if you were asked a week from now?

"I would not, in general, refuse any duties offered to me. However, this matter depends on the opposing candidate," was the answer.

A strong position of nonchurched people in the SKL causes Juntumaa to interject: a strong church representation would dispel the doubts being directed against the party.

Conservative Party Causes One to Smile

Any time there is mention of the comments about the Christian League on the part of the Conservative Party leadership, Raino Westerholm cannot help but smile even if good naturedly.

"In talking about a government base, Ilkka Suominen definitely had in mind a kind of two-party idea. I cannot imagine that the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League], the Liberal Party, and the Swedish People's Party will disappear. Neither will the Conservative Party be totally obedient to a bourgeois government in which we would be included."

Westerholm believes that the Conservative Party would place considerable distance between itself and the SKL, more than from the Center Party "since in the forthcoming program of the Conservative Party basic Christian values will not receive a clear expression".

However, the chairman refuses to name the Conservative Party as its chief competitor "since we only concentrate our efforts against negative issues".

Mud Slinging from the Swedish People's Party

Another issue which can cause Westerholm to become animated is the Swedish People's Party.

He states that the rank and file in Swedish-speaking areas continue to want to include the activities of the Christian League. This has naturally caused the NKP [Swedish People's Party] to stand up on its hind legs, especially since it is even otherwise struggling against declining support.

"We have not in the manner of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party attempted to make any alliances for the purpose of gaining support in Swedish-speaking areas," states Westerholm in defense of his party. The support base can grow.

At a certain meeting in Pohjanmaa he had firsthand experience of the wrath of the Swedish speaking people. Figuratively speaking, "he received a face-full of mud".

The Christian League is also keeping a lookout on those Christian groups which for the time being have entrenched themselves behind the wide back of other parties -- primarily the Center Party and the Conservative Party.

This brings into question, among other things, such groups as the Lapland Laestadians, who unlike the old Laestadian members of the Peace Association are more tolerant of influences outside of their own circle.

"Yasser Arafat Is a Terrorist"

In foreign policy the SKL has repeatedly declared that it supports Finland's official foreign policy, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

Taking exception to the important questions in the Near East, Westerholm does not consider that the position adopted with respect to the Near East is impartial: Finland discriminates against Israel.

Westerholm states that he is familiar with the problems of the Near East both from domestic as well as foreign sources and, therefore, has come to the following conclusions about the PLO's Yasser Arafat:

"He is a terrorist. Arafat's views are not constructive. The PLO's national program includes the destruction of the state of Israel.

"If Arafat should later make his position more tolerant and if the PLO's program is changed, then I am also ready to change my mind about him," adds Westerholm. He is, however, concerned about the positive attitude that EEC-countries have also expressed toward the PLO.

For the sake of impartiality, the SKL chairman also directs some criticism against Israel since from the Finnish point of view Jewish policy seems to be rather hard even though the direction is right.

Christian League Acts As Revival Movement for Those Sleeping

The Finnish Christian League has not so much taken voters away from other parties as it has aroused -- at least partially -- sleeping and complacent parties.

According to Raino Westerholm many Pentecostals who have never previously voted for anyone have come to support the Christian League.

This view is supported by Assistant Professor Pentti Manninen's research on Uusimaa and Etela-Hame, according to which a significant portion (5 percent) of those who did not vote in the 1975 parliamentary elections voted for a Christian League candidate 4 years later. The Constitutionalists People's Party and the Unification Party also lost a slight amount of support to the Christian League.

Presently the SKL has 10 Diet members.

In the last 5 years support has developed as follows:

In the 1975 parliamentary elections 3.3 percent, 9,599 votes.

In the 1976 local elections, 3.2 percent, 85,792 votes.

In the 1978 presidential elections, 8.8 percent, 215,244 votes.

In the 1979 parliamentary elections, 4.8 percent, 138,244 votes.

This year Chairman Westerholm has been kept occupied with the international situation. He does not support the boycott of the Moscow Olympics but considers that the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan have damaged the international atmosphere.

"In my opinion Finland's Afghanistan position in the UN should have been in accordance with the vote taken or intervention should have been condemned," states Westerholm.

A Heavenly Policy

The large parties admit that in the 1960's they made mistakes which allowed the SKL's seed to grow into a tree. Secularization took place too fast.

The first representative -- Raino Westerholm -- entered the Diet in 1970 and now Christian League representation has increased 10-fold.

The previous "holy trinity", abortion, marriage, and medium strength beer, has received additional programs around it and last winter at the ideological seminar of the SKL the Savings Bank Institute adopted a Christian point of view toward all social policy questions.

Church Affiliation Is Not Required

The layman continues to be surprised when he hears that nearly half of the Christian League members do not belong to a church.

From a religious point of view the party can be considered to be a kind of continuation of the fifth revival movement. This movement came to Finland after World War II and it forcefully emphasises personal decisions in faith and it continues the traditions of the so-called reform church and Anglo-Saxon directions.

According to Lutheran doctrine secular and spiritual lives are to be kept separate from one another, but in the manner of the fifth revival movement the SKL brings a Christian influence to practical politics.

A Christian Sausage?

People have wondered how there can be a Christian economic policy, a Christian foreign policy, and so on.

Or as a certain high ranking clergyman once said at the luncheon table: "There cannot be a Christian party since there is no such thing as a Christian sausage."

This has been considered to be one of the crisis points of the Christian League, into which opponents have attempted to drive a wedge.

They do not believe that all social activities can be "Christianized".

Nonaffiliation

The largest nonaffiliated groups of the SKL are pentecostals and congregationalists. What, then, units them with those who are affiliated with the church?

In all probability the world is experienced as "bad" in both quarters and in this they find a common ground. The method of the fifth revival movement for improving the world is, to a great degree, the same as that of the Pentecostals, for example.

In the SKL's Diet faction Party Secretary Esko Almgren from Kotka and Vaino Rautiainen from Keski-Suomi are Congregationalists. Ulla Jarvilehto from Uusimaa is a Pentecostal. Within the party leadership Vice Chairman Ilmari Helimaki and Organization Chief Timmo Traff are also Pentecostals.

Supporters of the Christian League are considered to be masters at gathering votes. In general, in the political arena organisational skills have been stated as follows: the best vote getters are the Laestadians, the second best is the Christian League, and the Taistoites come in third.

In the so-called new revivalist Laestadian areas the SKL has opportunities for expansion (in Lapland) since these movements also have a doctrinal link with the fifth revival movement.

On the other hand, the Christian League has not been able to get a foothold in the old Laestadian Peace Association, which is strong in the province of Oulu: even if an old Laesta ian becomes a member of the SKL, he still remains very much a member of the Peace Association (Rauhanyhdistys).

Old Comrades

Even though the membership of the Christian League is politically rather inexperienced, one can find some old political bulls: Diet Member Antero Juntumaa and former chairman Olavi Majlander were previously members of the Social Democratic Party.

Esko Almgren's defection from the Conservative Party still causes people to grieve on Kansakoulu Street.

The basis of Christian League policy is faith in God as Lord and Creator of the world. Thus after the parliamentary elections of 1975 the SKL offered thanks to the Most Highest for the seats gained in the Diet even though in Harri Holkeri's opinion thanks should have been given to the Conservative Party because of successful alliance work.

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CSO: 3107

POLL SHOWS MORE FAVOR KOIVISTO THAN UKK FOR PRESIDENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Jun 80 p 6

[Article: "Gallup Assessed Presidential Positions: Koivisto's Popularity Already Surpasses Kekkonen's"]

[Text] Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto (Social Democrat) continues to hold an overwhelming lead in the opinion poll concerning the next president of Finland. In a poll conducted by the Finnish Gallup Company and commissioned by SUOMEN KUVALEHTI Koivisto is easily a favorite over other politicians and even leads President Urho Kekkonen by a percentage figure of 43-13.

In the poll 952 voting age Finnish citizens were asked whom they would support for the next president. No names of possible candidates were presented to the respondents.

Koivisto received 46 percent of the vote, Kekkonen 13, SDP Chairman Kalevi Sorsa 2, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) 2, and Bank of Finland Director Ahti Karjalainen (Center Party), Assistant State Secretary Keijo Korhonen (Center Party), and City Manager Raimo Ilaskivi (Conservative Party) each received 1 percent of the votes.

It is significant that 32 percent were not able to choose a possible candidate. This group was primarily made up of those who are not affiliated with any political party.

Communists Undecided

Among the Social Democratic voters 60 percent said that they would support Koivisto. Chairman Sorsa was left with 2 percent of the support from Social Democrats.

Communist voters had the most doubts about Koivisto's presidency. Still 32 percent of them selected Koivisto. Kekkonen received 28 percent of the communist vote.

Even among Center Party supporters Koivisto held the lead. Koivisto received 33 percent or one-third of the votes from the Center Party.

Members of the Center Party gave 14 percent of their support to Kekkonen, 10 percent to Vayrynen, and 5 percent to Karjalainen. Johannes Virolainen obtained 1 percent of the support from his own party.

More than half or 53 percent of the Conservative Party declared their support for Koivisto. Bank Director Harri Holkeri and Raimo Ilaskivi each had to be satisfied with 2 percent.

Prime Minister Has Overwhelming Support

In the Finnish Gallup poll Koivisto was placed in opposition to the individuals mentioned below. However, the Prime Minister won overwhelming support in each case.

Koivisto beat commission on industry and commerce Director Max Jakobson by a percentage vote of 74-11. Four percent gave the candidates equal marks. Among the respondents 14 percent was undecided.

MTK [Agricultural Producers Association] Chairman Heikki Haavisto (Center Party) received 5 percent of the support against Koivisto's 81 percent. HUFVUDSTADSBLADET Chief Editor Jan-Magnus Jansson (Swedish Peoples Party) received 3 percent of the support against Koivisto's 84. Archbishop Mikko Juva received 7 percent against Koivisto's 81 percent and Governor Kauko Sipponen of the province of Keski-Suomi received 3 percent of the support against Koivisto's 82 percent.

10576
CSO: 3107

ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE GIVES FIVE-YEAR FORECAST

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 May 80 p 24

[Article: "Finland Doing Better Than Other Countries -- Unemployment Biggest Problem"]

[Text] Finland's economic growth during the first half of the 1980's may be faster than the average in other western industrialized countries. Growth will definitely slow down from the current high rate to an approximate 4 percent annually.

Thus was the prediction of Etla [Research Institute of Commerce and Industry] in mapping out economic prospects for the next 5 years. This prediction made by its managing director, Kauno Ranta, however, presupposes controls on economic development in the manner of recent years and labor contracts that are more moderate than those of this year.

The long awaited recession will come next year, but it will not cause the prediction's economic indicators to be adjusted downward too much. This recession is seen to bring far less damage to Finland than the recession of 5 years ago. Ranta predicts that economic growth will make a comeback already in 1982.

Etla will evaluate many of its economic indicators for the decade now beginning primarily on the basis of recent figures.

Among other things, the dreaded inflation will accelerate this and next year, but will then level off to the tolerable level of recent years.

However, the black sheep in this picture will continue to be unemployment, which is calculated to remain at approximately 5 percent of the labor force. The prediction confirms that there will definitely be additional jobs in the near future, but the coming of age of a large number of workers will keep unemployment at the previous level. Approximately 60,000 additional people will be entering the labor force.

Unemployment to Remain at Current Level

In the opinion of the Research Institute of Commerce and Industry there is reason to precisely determine the level of unemployment and to adopt programs aimed at its reduction. Etla estimates that the so-called natural level of unemployment has apparently risen to a level higher than in previous years.

In its prediction Etla proceeds from the fact that the growth of the gross national product in the OECD area will remain at an annual rate of 2 percent. However, the coming recession will not be as severe as the recession in the years 1974-75.

Finland's exports will, however, increase 5 percent annually due to increased trade with the East. The increase in the price of oil has brought about a trade deficit with the Soviet Union and this in turn promotes exports.

According to Etla the price competitiveness of price exports will decrease slightly this and next year, but will remain at a tolerable level and in the future will return to tis previous competitive position.

Inflation will increase at a rate of approximately 11 percent this year and next year, but will then slow down to a 7.5-percent level. At that time real income will increase at an annual rate of approximately 2 percent.

Individual investments and individual consumption will increase approximately 3.5 percent annually. Public investments will increase by 1 percent and expenditures by 2.5 percent. Etla bases these low estimates on the proposed economic policy goals.

Foreign Debt Will Remain in Check

In the next 5 years imports will increase at approximately the same rate as the gross national product or 4 percent annually. The growth of the gross national product is the same on the average as for the last 15 years.

Etla calculates that the balance of payments with respect to foreign trade will weaken in the very near future and that it will remain at a deficit for the next 5 years. Indeed, it considers that the deficits will be small toward the middle of the decade.

According to Etla's prediction the foreign debt will remain in check since after an initial increase it will later return to the current level.

The money market will remain relatively tight in the near future, but Etla considers that they will only limit the demands of households.

The growth of industrial production is expected to be rather favorable in the near future. In the years 1980-84 industrial production will increase at an average rate of 5 percent annually, which is double that of the rate for the last 5-year period. However, this growth rate is definitely slower than the average for a longer period of time, points out Etla.

Production will increase the most in the metal industry and the chemical industry. Production in the construction industry will increase only 2.5 percent annually.

Growth in the service industry will be equal to that of the gross national product. Growth in the production of trade will in the near future be more rapid than in the previous 5-year period, but slower than in the first half of the 1970's.

During the next 5-year period agricultural production will remain at last year's level. Forestry production will grow more slowly than production in the forest industry since the forest industry intends to raise its processing level.

Etla Noted Other Alternatives

Etla's prospects are based on the so-called basic alternatives it has compiled. The research institute has, however, also noted other alternatives since in its opinion economic development is overshadowed by a number of national and international uncertainties.

Etla continues to doubt that inflation will be kept in check. If the inflation rate accelerates, economic prospects will also become gloomier. A 2-percent increase in the annual inflation rate will reduce GNP growth by 0.5 percent annually.

Etla has also calculated what will happen if public demand or international demand is 1 percent greater than in the basic alternative. Both alternatives would increase the gross national product at a slightly faster rate than calculated. Instead unemployment would decrease since an accelerated inflation rate for its part would improve the unemployment situation.





Key:

1. Changes in consumer prices in Finland and OECD-countries %.
2. Finland
3. Developent of real prices for crude oil and its derivatives
4. Actual
5. Average increase of 10 percent annually.
6. Average increase of 16 percent annually.
7. 1972 equals 100, deflated by export prices of industrial products

10576
CSO: 3107

MERGER OF FOREIGN SCHOOLS REPORTED

Athens THE ATHENIAN in English Jul 80 p 35

[Text]

PERHAPS the most significant development in the world of foreign education in Athens during the past year has been the affiliation of the American School in Switzerland (TASIS) with the Hellenic International School (HIS). During the first year of the joint operation the two schools worked as separate entities with their own headmasters and administrative staff, but with the retirement of HIS head, Lloyd E. Pawlett, Jr., it was decided to appoint a single director for both schools, Dr. John H. Bruce.

One of the foremost international educators, Dr. Bruce comes to TASIS/HIS with an impressive administrative background that includes three previous tenures as headmaster at international schools in Vienna, Manila, and most recently the United Nations International School in New York. A strong advocate of widely based international curricula, Dr. Bruce serves currently as a member of the North American Board of the International Baccalaureate Organization and has already announced plans to expand substantially the already existing B.C.E. 'O' and 'A' level courses offered at HIS.

At the first combined commencement exercises of the two schools, held on May 29th at the Hotel Cecil, Mrs. Mary Cruz Fleming and Dr. Robert Betts, founder directors of TASIS and HIS respectively, were asked by The Athenian to elaborate on the background of their affiliation and the plans for future development.

"TASIS has always been primarily a boarding school," explained Mrs. Fleming, "but in 1976, after nearly a quarter-century at our original campus in Lugano, Switzerland, we decided to branch out in order to better meet the changing educational needs resulting from recent international developments. In that year our second boarding school was opened in England at Thorpe in Surrey (eight miles from the center of London and six from Heathrow Airport), and almost immediately we found ourselves serving a day school market as well. This year our total enrollment in England of 325 is about one-half boarding students. When we decided to extend our operations to Greece in 1979 we again based our plans on a primarily boarding school program and secured the Hotel Cecil for that purpose only to discover the existence of the established Hellenic International day high school right on our doorstep. Cooperation appeared almost pre-ordained, and happily for us, Dr. Betts was thinking on the same wave-length. Within a few weeks of our first meeting, the affiliation of the two

[illegible]

For ASIS the [illegible] of [illegible] is at hand and an opportunity not to be missed," continued Dr. Betts. "Although we had been in existence for nearly ten years with enrollments that dated to the founding of the Hellenic American School at Nea Smyrni in 1959, we had always lacked the necessity, both financial and educational, that a long-established group of non-traditional schools such as TASIS enjoys. By the addition our students' future was assured and we could look ahead with confidence. I might also add that the Greek Ministry of Education was pleased to see our association with a strongly based European institution such as TASIS in the light of Greece's imminent entry into the Common Market."

Both Mrs. Fleming and Dr. Betts stressed the point that the affiliated schools have definite plans over the next several years to expand their educational program with a view to establishing an autonomous secondary section based exclusively on the English G.C.E. curriculum. "As early as 1975 we had seen the advantages of expanding our American based course offerings," explained Dr. Betts, "and with the expansion of European operations in Greece as part of the Common Market association, we anticipate a gradual but definite change in our enrollment to reflect this expansion, and we must be prepared to meet the educational needs of European families. One of the factors that strongly motivated Dr. Bruce to accept the position of overall Director of the two Schools was our strong commitment to a broadly based international educational program. And with his unique background and expertise the quality of education which we offer should continue to improve at all levels."

Dr. Bruce, who is currently an educational consultant for the Rockefeller Foundation, will arrive in Athens in mid-July to assume his new position. He has already made two extended visits and expressed to The Athenian his pleasure at the prospect of living and working in Athens and enthusiasm for the program he hopes to develop and expand on behalf of TASIS and HIS. "I have known Mrs. Fleming and her schools for many years," he remarked, "and know first-hand her commitment to high quality education. HIS has done a commendable job in so short a time and will provide me with a solid foundation on which to build. I am looking forward to the challenge." ■

CSO: 4920

OCEAN LINER CONVERTED TO HOSPITAL

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 14 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by Nikitas Orfanidis: "Floating Hospital With 800 Beds and Electronic Systems in Faliron]

[Text] A group of Greek doctors is promising to supply by the end of 1980 high level care on a luxurious floating hospital with 800 beds and the aid of all the modern technological achievements in the diagnostic and therapeutic sectors to the population of the Attiki basin. The new model nursing unit will operate on a luxurious ocean liner which has already been appropriately remodeled and will anchor permanently somewhere in the Faliron Delta "in order to immediately cover urgent needs caused by a shortage of hospital clinics in the entire area of the capital." The new unit, which has been given the name "General Therapeutic and Diagnostic Floating Center of Greece," will have nearly all the specialties and will offer its services not only to private persons but also to insured persons from all the insurance funds.

Indeed, the provisional administration of the floating hospital promises that it will accept patients from the funds at an official third-class rating despite the fact that this clinic does not have third-class beds. The ocean liner has 411 rooms on seven floors. Each room, besides its luxurious equipment, even has an electronic screen on which, at a touch of a button, the entire history of each patient can be transmitted, as well as any information concerning his or her treatment. The doctor can check various examinations of the patient on the same screen. The system functions with the aid of three computers which have been installed on the floating hospital. There will be a private telephone, radio and television at the disposal of every patient in all the rooms. All of the modern electronic means of diagnosis and therapy, even a CAT scanner, are already on the floating hospital ready for the doctors' use. All the treatment rooms, except for 13, are doubles or singles. More specifically, there are 39 singles and the rest are doubles. There are also two three-bed suites. The enterprise stated that it will always have 20 beds available in the basement for care of the needy.

The floating ship, which, it is believed, will be "something different for the Greek person undergoing treatment," cost its owners, doctors and businessmen more than a billion drachmas. Originally, the ocean liner was destined to be a tourist hotel. Later, however, it was deemed more advantageous to turn it into a hospital.

According to its owners' assurances, it is not going to create ocean pollution problems. Provisions have been made to connect it to the Athens central sewer system.

The Ministry of Social Services agreed at the beginning to grant an operating permit to the floating hospital and it has offered to alter certain specifications indispensable for the establishment of private clinics because they do not apply to a ship. The Athens Medical Association accepted with gratitude the establishment of a floating hospital because it will cover a large part of the vacuum due to the shortage of hospital beds and, at the same time, it will employ a fair number of doctors. On the other hand, the Panhellenic Medical Association [PIS] censured "the applied hospital policy which officially introduces colonialistic, speculative exploitation in the sector of health" and calls "all the national health forces to alert for prevention of the invasion of large foreign and local capital in the area of our health."

In its announcement, PIS reports, among other things, the following: With the secret and, consequently, libellous hospital policy, the development of hospital clinics through public investments has been impeded up to now because thus ground is ensured for the lucrative investment of foreign and local capital in private hospital operations. With secrecy, the Ministry of Social Services gave a permit for operation in Faliron Haven of a speculative, private floating hospital and, for its "legalization," the evasion of regulations concerning clinics is being prepared because ships are inappropriate for hospitals.

Greek private clinics have been condemned to extermination with the degrading hospital fees given to them because the road is thus opened for foreign health supermarkets. Instead of creating the tendency for completely substituting public for private economic initiative in health care, roads are being officially opened for its commercial exploitation which will be emphasized with our accession into the EEC.

9247
CSO: 4908

COST OF LIVING INDEX NEARS 30 PERCENT

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 14 Jun 80 p 1

[Text] The cost of living index is "galloping" at a rate of more than 27 to 28 percent a year according to authoritative information given on 13 June. The index of consumer prices for May closed at 1.2 percent (versus 1.1 percent in May 1979) and official forecasts raise the percentage for June to 2.5 to 2.8 (versus 1 percent in June 1980).

The government, added the above information, attributes the sensational rise in the index of prices for June to the price increases in fuel (1.30 percent) and the particularly increased prices of late fruits and vegetables, price increases in newspapers, prices of summer clothing, etc. Government forecasts on the subject are that during the coming month a considerable decrease will be noted in the rate of increase of the index of consumer prices (in spite of the indirect effects of the cost increases in fuels which will entail a new one-percent surcharge). This will result in holding the cost of living index to 25 percent for 1980, or even to it being decreased to 23 percent.

During the first five months of 1979, the index of consumer prices rose to 10.9 percent versus 5.2 percent in the first five months of 1978. This alone shows that this year it will exceed 30 percent and government forecasts are unrealistic.

The 'Freeze' Ends

On 15 June, the period for the "freeze" on prices is ending. The related agreement with merchants is not going to be extended. This was declared by Minister of Commerce Dimas.

An increase in the prices of imported items is expected to occur because of increases in the cost and acquisition elements and change in the equivalency of the drachma versus foreign currencies.

The increase, which could not be estimated precisely, probably fluctuates between 10 to 15 percent.

Profits on imports will continue to be frozen at November 1979 levels, while consumers ultimately are also illegally burdened with 25 percent of the surcharge on imported items which continues to remain "loaded" from imports onto the prices of products.

Bankruptcies

Both bankruptcies of businesses and protests of bills of exchange are running at normal levels; therefore, there is no justification for worry--or the noise which part of the opposition provoked.

This statement was made on 13 June by Minister Without Portfolio Io. Palaiokrassas who furnished the following data from the Union of Greek Banks:

There were 170 bankruptcies declared during the first five months of 1980 in Athens. Last year, there were 245 in the first six months and 201 in the second.

There were 1,473 petitions for bankruptcy in the first five months of 1980 versus 1,538 in the first six months of 1979 and 1,477 in the second.

There were 625,973 protests of bills of exchange in Athens for all of 1979; the bills had a total value of 9.8 billion drachmas.

In the first four months of 1980, there were 208,755 protests, concerning a value of 4.2 billion drachmas, while in May 1980 99,504 bills of exchange, worth 2.2 billion drachmas, were protested.

There were 557,9[illegible]1 protests, worth about 10.3 billion drachmas, in the prefecture for all of 1979, while in the first four months of 1980 there were 207,308 at a value of 4.2 billion drachmas.

9247
CSO: 4908

CPN CONGRESS PUBLISHES RESOLUTIONS

Amsterdam DE WAARHEID in Dutch 11 Jun 80 p 8

/Text/ The CPN /Communist Party of the Netherlands/ Congress changed the four draft resolutions which were submitted to the party several months ago in a number of points before approving them. Many motions for changes were already made at members' meetings and district conferences, but still various motions for changes were also made at the Congress itself. The draft resolution on action against nuclear armament, for peace and security was especially expanded in a series of points.

Nuclear Power

Thus in amplifying the section on nuclear power, a close connection was made between unjustified use of nuclear power, the demand for the shutdown of Netherlands nuclear power plants and the danger of world proliferation of atomic weapons. In this connection, it pointed out the export of fissionable material and atomic technology, among other things, to the Third World.

An expanded addition is dedicated to the attitude of the trade union movement towards the armaments industry. The armaments industry, according to the resolution, offers no solution for employment, but puts heavy pressure on the economy and contributes to the rise of Rightist political extremism. Armament capital also has a great influence on the military machine.

It also pointed out the importance of the soldiers' struggle for social and democratic demands and against militarization and weapons of mass destruction. It also referred to the importance of the experiences in the struggle against German fascism which was agreed to unanimously and acting against the dangers to peace on a broad front.

Regarding the international situation, the new resolution now has a reference added about the aggressive attitude of the Carter government in America which leads to threats to peace.

Afghanistan

Regarding the settlement of international differences it was pointed out that political solutions must be sought for the conflicts in the Middle East and the crisis connected with Iran and Afghanistan, rejecting any military intervention.

Among the goals in the struggle for peace there are added an international ban on the neutron bomb, prevention of the implementation of the NATO missile-decision taken in December 1979, banning of bacteriological and chemical weapons and the immediate ratification of the Salt-2 Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Besides the denial of atomic weapons to the FRG and the new F-16 jet fighters, steps were demanded to get the Netherlands out of NATO, with the final goal of eliminating the military blocs.

The resolution further demands the termination of boycott measures against the Soviet Union and the development of East-West dialogue, in which the small and medium sized countries and especially the nonaligned countries can play an important, positive role.

Tackle Top Incomes

To combat unemployment besides profits, the top incomes and fortunes must also be attacked. The CPN Congress expressed that point of view in a number of changes and amplifications in the draft resolution about social-economic struggle.

In these amplifications and changes, other measures were also mentioned to combat unemployment: reduction of armament, promotion of national and economic employment interests, specific granting of relief under control of the employees, reduction of the working day.

The Congress further declared that in the protection of the standard of living, maintenance of purchasing power through increased wages and full cost of living adjustments have priority.

Moreover changes were included which emphasize the importance of strong solidarity with foreign workers in the Netherlands, who are exposed to denial of rights and discrimination. As the congress states, they play their own important role in the struggle; as part of the Netherlands' working class.

Other changes in the draft text of the resolution had especially as their purpose offering another interpretation in the evaluation of the social-economic situation in the Netherlands.

Consequently it went more extensively into the position of the various regions, youth and women. More attention was given to the situation in which farmers, middle class people and other groups of independents operate. The continuous housing emergency and the threat to the environment are mentioned as fields where the results of the capitalist crisis and government policy are expressed.

Inflation

It was also declared that the policy of restraint had not led to curbing high prices. Inflation is increasing and is still encouraged by heavier government taxes. It stated that while the profits of the miltinationals and the banks increase additionally, a drop in the standard of living of the working class and especially of those receiving social benefits is threatened.

Another amplification of the resolution declares that the actions in the early months of 1980--followed since then by action for wage and other demands in different businesses and branches--have made it clear that the working class is not putting up with wage control and the Enabling Act, in which the government has taken refuge.

Women's Liberation

All resolutions except those about peace and security were amplified with sections about women's position. In the resolution about social-economic struggle the congress decided to include the following addition: mass unemployment affects women especially. In this, the oppression of women in the social-economic field is especially expressed. Meanwhile realization of the right to paid work is hampered by forms of discrimination and lack of facilities, such as child care.

The resolution accepted by the congress especially mentioned actions of women in the social-economic field such as for paid work, benefits, measures against discrimination and demonstrations of solidarity, just as the role of women in the Rotterdam harbor strike.

Providing assistance which is necessary for the liberation of women is regarded as a high priority. The congress included in the parliamentary resolution that the struggle for the liberation of women from every form of oppression and exploitation is especially important. A section on the conflict about abortion is also included.

In the resolution about strengthening the CPN and the note pertaining to it, additions are included which refer to CPN views regarding the women's liberation struggle and about setting up women's consultation in the party. These additions were published in last Monday's DE WAARHEID

8490
CSO: 3105

ALBEDA HOLDS KEY TO 1981 BUDGET

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 30 May 80 p 7

[Article by J.M. Bik]

[Text] If the cabinet manages to survive this summer's (July/August) budget debates it will also stay alive till the next elections (May 1981). This is now the general impression at the Binnenhof. After that we will have the merger of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] parties on 11 October, the decisions about election programs, the nominations of the top men on the lists of candidates, and the election campaign which has probably begun already.

It is generally understood that if a crisis should occur, the always decisive CDA delegation in the Second Chamber would prefer to see it settled within the cabinet instead of in a confrontation between the cabinet and the chamber. Settlement within the cabinet could indeed cover up whether there is a split between the coalition partners or in the bosom of the cabinet, whereas the second possibility, a crisis in the chamber, could expose internal discord and force the delegation to become instrumental in dismissing the first man in the CDA, namely Prime Minister Van Agt.

It is now and has also been generally assumed that the smaller coalition partner, the VVD [League of Freedom and Democracy], will, through its ministers in the cabinet, do anything to avoid an internal split over the budget question with the CDA colleagues. The incidents surrounding the resignation of Andriessen as minister of finance taught us a few months ago that the VVD (Deputy Prime Minister Wiegel) is prepared to go all the way to hold on to its share of the government responsibility (or a possible continuation after May 1981). In the conflict between Andriessen and his colleague Albeda (social affairs), the VVD's ideas agreed with those of the minister of finance but it actually supported Albeda who prevailed.

This point, the VVD's flexibility as already praised by Van Agt, appears at first sight to increase the cabinet's survival chances considerably. However, this time appearances could be deceptive.

Now, what are the facts? Because of the magnitude of the problems the cabinet is confronting the most difficult budget preparations of the last decades. Willingness to accept personal income reduction is very small; it should have offered the "real" solution via a management of adaptation for (semi-) civil servants and the mechanism which relates to social benefits. Once again, this was made very clear by Mr Schelling's tough speech at this week's celebration of the merger of the FNV [Federation of Netherlands Labor Unions] food industry unions. (Under the same circumstances, would it really have made a difference if there had been a different cabinet?). The wage measures, really no more than a stop gap which irritates the social partners, could be followed by a sequel, but it would remain a poor expedient. Till further notice the cabinet will have to put up with what is really putting the cart before the horse, namely, save what it can through fiscal restraints and limitations on collective expenses.

Prime Minister Van Agt, probing the future, spoke recently of the need to save 5 billion guilders. That amount could increase by 1.5 billion guilders because of ineffective agreements in the present budget, while the Bureau of Planning could inflict new disappointments in the area of tax receipts and inflationary developments in the second half of August.

Although the present figures are more trend-setting than precise, one may expect that the cabinet in its last year will have to come up with a system of cost-cutting economies of enormous proportions if it does not want to get stuck with a calamitous deficit in excess of the already sharply defined border of the financing deficit (Growth is zero, maybe even negative, the balance of payments of this semi-OPEC country on the North Sea deteriorates fast).

The accommodating attitude of the VVD ministers--if it indeed exists--by order of Mr Wiegel can hardly be of any help in this case, most certainly not after the years of cutbacks in the departmental budgets we have been through. The cabinet has various reasons to give a certain priority to the Ministries of Housing, Defense, and Development Cooperation (incidentally administered by three CDA ministers) and it is therefore questionable if cutbacks in government expenses will in the end actually be more than a few hundreds of millions of guilders. This does not amount to much therefore; the VVD ministers will probably be willing to help out, that will be all.

It should be clear that even with the anticipated increases in the price of natural gas (export prices), drastic measures in the area of social benefit expenses will be unavoidable, i.e. the conflict will take place this summer on the territory of the government leaders of the Ministry of Social Affairs (the ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] members Albeda and De Graaf) and their civil service staffs; in this connection the name A.B. Raven merits special attention. It is the name of the powerful head of the Directorate of Labor Relations; one of Albeda's colleagues described him recently as "the Red Rasputin on Zeestraat who manipulates Albeda and De Graaf."

Billions will probably have to come out of social benefits and--even though it may sound insensitive--at short notice. An overhaul of the executive branches of social insurance or a more stringent volume control (limiting the number of welfare recipients by applying stricter conditions) will not achieve enough, and certainly not fast enough. The number of unemployed increases slowly, but it goes up, the number of WAO [permanently disabled] and AAW recipients is coming close to 700,000; the knife cuts both ways with increasing sharpness; in a crowded country with a stagnating economy these burdens will grow increasingly heavier.

Under these circumstances the question is again: when there is little to cheer us up in the fight for income reductions of active workers, how long can we postpone a decision on the ever more pressing optional solutions? For instance: should the payment percentage of social benefits be reduced over the entire front from 80 to 75 percent, should this be the case above a certain minimum income, or should the connection between active workers and nonactive persons be abandoned? If nothing is heard about such optional solutions behind the fences of The Hague, that does not mean that these problems do not exist.

It is very doubtful whether Minister Albeda and State Secretary De Graaf would want to be involved in steps only slightly in the direction of the above-mentioned solutions which they certainly consider draconian. Both gentlemen were distinctly related with the CNV [Christian National Labor League] which is already complaining about the ideological distance which separates it from the CDA and the government. A significant cut in the social benefit system, even to salvage as much as possible of that system (and a reasonable relation between active and nonactive persons) could evaporate Albeda's and De Graaf's remaining goodwill with CNV Chairman Van der Meulen. Such goodwill can hardly be found with the FNV. As far as this subject is concerned next summer's discussions could for Albeda become a choice between Van Agt and Van der Meulen. No matter what the choice will be, Albeda will be holding the key. Nobody knows how he will use it, a frightening prospect.

10319
CSO: 3103

SOCIALIST FRONT APPEARS WEAK IN POLL, OTHERS STABLE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 21 Jun 80 pp 4,5

[Text] The reason for the five questions in the EXPRESSO/Norma poll: The questions chosen by EXPRESSO to be asked in the poll published today were based on the following reasons:

In the first place, it is still considered important to find out what is the level of popularity of General Ramalho Eanes and Dr Francisco Sa Carneiro in terms of the performance of their duties as president of the republic and prime minister, respectively.

As was announced previously, EXPRESSO intends to measure these popularity levels until the 10th poll, which completes the series, in order that it may be possible to determine how the Portuguese react to the political activity of Eanes and Sa Carneiro from now until the election period.

Another question that is raised in this ninth EXPRESSO/Norma poll is the degree of recognition the Portuguese have of some of the principal ministers who govern them.

For that purpose, EXPRESSO chose the names of the following members of the government, listing them according to rank: Sa Carneiro, Freitas do Amaral, Pinto Balsemao, Amaro da Costa, Eurico de Melo, Cavaco Silva, Marques de Carvalho, Morais Leitao, Cardoso e Cunha, Basilio Horta e Alvaro Barreto.

The fourth question concerns determining the state of mind of the Portuguese voter in face of the approaching prospect of legislative elections. In that connection, it was worth knowing if he intends to vote, and if he were to vote now which political organization would he vote for.

For this purpose, a system was used that was intended to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot; a list was made up containing the names of the major political organizations, which was dropped in a ballot box after being filled.

Finally, the fifth question asked in this poll pertains to the year end elections for president of the republic. Taking as a basis, the candi-

already announced as well as those that appear to stem from the political events of recent months, EXPRESSO wanted to know if those polled intended to vote in the presidential election as well as who they would vote for if they were to vote today.

These were the five questions chosen by EXPRESSO and asked in the districts of Lisbon, Setubal, Braganca and Faro.

This is the penultimate exclusive EXPRESSO/Norma poll, which will be followed by the last one to be published on 5 July, that is shortly before the scheduling of legislative elections, which will make it legally impossible for the communications media to disseminate and publish public opinion polls.

Eanes: High Popularity in Setubal and Faro

The first question in the poll was: "Do you personally approve or disapprove of the way General Ramalho Eanes performs as president of the republic? (See Table I).

That performance is approved by 48, 64, 45, and 63 percent of the persons questioned in Lisbon, Setubal, Braganca and Faro, respectively.

It is disapproved by 22 percent in Lisbon, 12 percent in Setubal, 9 percent in Braganca and 15 percent in Faro.

Do you know: 17 percent in Lisbon, 21 percent in Setubal, 36 percent in Braganca and 18 percent in Faro.

The percentage of those who do not respond is relatively low: 13 percent in Lisbon, 3 percent in Setubal, 10 percent in Braganca and 4 percent in Faro.

A comparison of the results gathered in Lisbon now with those of the eighth poll published 2 weeks ago shows a decline in General Ramalho Eanes' popularity level, with a 5 percent decrease of those approving and a 3 percent increase of those disapproving.

A comparison of this poll with the sixth poll, in which the same other districts were included, shows that Eanes gained in Setubal (with a 7 percent increase of those approving against a 2 percent increase of those disapproving), and in Braganca (with a 7 percent increase of those approving against a 2 percent decrease of those disapproving).

He declined in Faro, where the percentage of those approving decreased 12 percent and those disapproving increased 2 percent.

Generally, General Ramalho Eanes' popularity level in terms of his performance in the position of president of the republic tends to remain at a quite appreciable level, particularly in Setubal and Faro even though there was a drop in the latter district compared to the 10 May 1980 poll.

The level obtained in Braganca and Lisbon is also appreciable.

However, Eanes declined in the Lisbon district and the number of those who did not respond also increased (4 percent 2 weeks ago and 13 percent now).

As for those who say they do not know how to respond, the percentage decreased since the eigth poll (24 percent 2 weeks ago and 17 percent now).

In any case, the results gathered are quite positive and are in keeping with those obtained in the successive exclusive EXPRESSO/Norma polls.

This may mean that, as of the date of the taking of the ninth poll (12 to 14 June), there has not been any significant erosion of Ramalho Eanes' political image despite the confrontations that have occurred between the president of the republic and the government, supported by the majority of the Assembly of the Republic, which was formed as a result of legislative elections of 2 December.

In the next poll we shall see what develops for General Ramalho Eanes after the politically very significant date of 10 June as well as after the open beginning of the double election campaign for the Assembly of the Republic and for the presidency of the republic.

Table I

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Approve	48	64	45	63
Disapprove	22	12	9	15
Do not know	17	21	36	18
Do not respond	13	3	10	4

Sa Carelro: Setubal Is a Black Point

The second question in the poll also was not changed: "Do you personally approve or disapprove of the way Dr Sa Carelro is performing as prime minister and chief of government? (See Table II).

The prime minister's performances received the approval of 41, 30, 57 and 54 percent of those questioned in Lisbon, Setubal, Braganca and Faro, respectively.

Sa Carelro's performance is disapproved by 33 percent in Lisbon, 47 percent in Setubal, 16 percent in Braganca and 27 percent in Faro.

The undecided are 18 percent in the capital, 19 percent in Setubal, 16 percent in Braganca and 12 percent in Faro.

Do not respond: 8 percent, 4 percent, 11 percent and 7 percent, in Lisbon, Setubal, Braganca and Faro, respectively.

Comparing the results of this poll with those of the previous one shows that there has been a 13 percent increase of those approving and a 22 percent decrease of those disapproving Francisco Sa Carneiro, all of it in Lisbon district.

There is thus a very substantial inversion of Sa Carneiro's popularity in Lisbon, going from a 27 percent negative difference between those approving and those disapproving to a positive difference of 8 percent.

A comparison of the percentages of these four districts with those obtained in the sixth poll published on 10 May, shows that in Lisbon Sa Carneiro perceptibly maintains the positive position he held at that time.

In Setubal, those approving increased from 26 to 30 percent, and those disapproving, from 44 to 47 percent.

In Braganca, those approving increased from 46 to 57 percent, and those disapproving from 6 to 16 percent.

It is in Faro that Sa Carneiro's increase is by far the sharpest.

As a matter of fact, the sixth poll showed 27 percent approving and 50 percent disapproving, and now the ratio is completely reversed: the prime minister now has 54 percent approving and 27 percent disapproving.

Overall, the results of this ninth poll show an appreciable popularity percentage figure for Sa Carneiro with Setubal being the only black point.

Particularly worthy of note is the change that has occurred in Lisbon after 1 week of public reappearance of the prime minister following almost 1 month away from the active exercise of his position for reasons of health.

Lisbon always operates as a barometer that is extremely sensitive to changes in the situation, so the change stemming from the results now published should not be too surprising.

Braganca is a case of a district with strong Democratic Alliance (AD) election influence so the results are not overly surprising.

As for Faro, the surprise may be greater, keeping in mind the electoral influence of the Socialist Party and even the antecedent represented by the previous polls which covered this district (in the third poll published on 29 March, Sa Carneiro obtained 26 percent approval and 21 percent disapproval).

Strangely enough, this improvement in Sa Carneiro's image in Faro coincides with a rise of the AD in that district, moving ahead of the Socialist Front, as can be confirmed from the replies to the fourth question, which asked those polled to vote now, choosing one of the various political organizations that will contend in the elections next fall for the Assembly of the Republic.

Table II

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Approve	41	30	57	54
Disapprove	33	47	16	27
Do not know	18	19	16	12
Do not respond	8	4	11	7

The Best Known Ministers: Sa Carneiro, F. Amaral, Amaro da Costa, Alvaro Barreto, P. Balsemao and B. Horta

The third question asked those polled to say which of the ministers in a list presented to them they knew.

That list included the following names: Francisco Sa Carneiro, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, Francisco Pinto Balsemao, Adelino Amaro da Costa, Eurico de Melo, Cavaco e Silva, Eusebio Marques de Carvalho, Joao Morais Leitao, Jose Cardoso e Cunha, Basilio Horta and Alvaro Barreto.

As was to be expected, Sa Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral stood out by far, around 90 percent. Strangely enough, Freitas do Amaral emerges with higher percentages than Sa Carneiro except in Lisbon.

After them, we can find a group of four quite well-known ministers: Pinto Balsemao, Alvaro Barreto, Amaro da Costa and Basilio Horta.

Pinto Balsemao is fourth in Lisbon, fifth in Setubal, fifth in Braganca and fifth in Faro.

Alvaro Barreto is third in Lisbon, sixth in Setubal, sixth in Braganca and third in Faro.

Amaro da Costa is fifth in Lisbon, third in Setubal, third in Braganca and third in Faro.

Basilio Horta is sixth in Lisbon, Third in Setubal along with Amaro de Costa, fourth in Braganca and fourth in Faro.

Following these ministers, Cavaco Silva stands alone with a reasonable percentage in Lisbon and Braganca.

All the others remain quite below that except in Braganca, a district having AD election influence.

Table III

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Sa Carneiro	99	92	87	88
Freitas Do Amaral	99	98	92	93
Pinto Balsemao	53	50	42	30
Amaro da Costa	51	52	57	56
Eurico de Melo	8	13	28	11
Cavaco e Silva	46	29	36	29
Marques de Carvalho	12	16	31	10
Morais Leitao	12	9	31	11
Cardoso e Cunha	12	12	29	13
Basilio Horta	50	52	46	34
Alvaro Barreto	58	46	36	30

Legislative Elections: Socialist Front Weakens

The fourth question pertained to exercising the right to vote in the elections for the presidency of the republic. Those polled were asked if they intended to vote, then they were asked to vote under the same conditions as in a normal election (that is, secret vote and indicating the party or front preferred from among those mentioned in the list given them by the pollster (See Table IV).

The intention to vote is very high in all districts (Lisbon, 90 percent; Setubal, 92 percent; Braganca, 90 percent and Faro, 91 percent).

The percentages of those who do not vote, who still do not know and of those who do not respond.

Analyzing the results of the voting on the list presented by the pollster indicates that the AD would win in all districts except Setubal, where it would come out in second place, after the United People's Alliance (APU).

Comparing this with the last poll, the AD rises from 28 to 43 percent while the Socialist Front drops from 27 to 19 percent.

The APU drops slightly, from 16 to 12 percent.

The result in Faro, a district with Socialist electoral influence, is significant: the AD beats the Socialist Front by 6 percentage points.

The AD's advantage is very striking in Braganca and even in Setubal it beats the Socialist Front by 3 percentage points.

Generally, the Democratic Alliance obtains good results in all election districts while the results of the Socialist Front are quite weak.

The percentages of those questioned who do not mention any voting choice, however, are still quite high: 22 percent in Lisbon, 25 percent in Setubal, 49 percent in Braganca and 24 percent in Faro.

Table IV

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Vote	90	92	90	91
Do not vote	4	5	8	9
Do not know	6	3	--	--
Do not respond	--	--	2	--
Vote for:				
AD	43	18	36	36
APU	12	35	3	10
Progress Front (PS/UEDS/ASDI)	19	15	12	30
UDP	3	6	--	--
Others	1	1	--	--
Do not say	22	25	49	24

Presidential Elections: Eanes Loses Ground in Lisbon

As for the presidential elections, the intention to vote continues to be very high in all districts covered by the poll (Lisbon, 92 percent; Setubal, 93 percent; Braganca, 90 percent; and Faro, 91 percent).

In general the intention to vote is even higher than recorded in the previous polls (for example, in Lisbon it increased from 89 percent to 92 percent).

As for the contenders listed, the results show that Ramhalho Eanes is in front in all districts followed by Soares Carneiro, except in Setubal, where he is followed by Costa Gomes.

Ramalho Eanes loses ground badly in Lisbon vis-a-vis Soares Carneiro (in the last poll the percentages were 41 percent for Ramalho Eanes and 14 percent for Soares Carneiro).

In Braganca, the distance between the two politicians is also quite close: only 2 percent.

That distance widens in Setubal and Faro.

As for the rest of the candidates, Costa Gomes declines in Lisbon compared to the last poll but obtains a good percentage in Setubal.

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho also declines in Lisbon, and in Setubal he stays behind Costa Gomes.

Pires Veloso declines slightly in Lisbon, but he obtains a reasonable percentage in Faro and a quite appreciable one in Braganca, where he approaches Ramalho Eanes and Soares Carneiro.

Galvao de Melo holds the same position he held in the last poll, rising slightly in Lisbon, from 3 to 4 percent, but he practically does not exist in the rest of the country.

The percentages of those polled who prefer not to vote for any of the names offered them to choose from remains reasonably high, and actually very high in Braganca (30 percent).

This poll was taken before the official presentation of the candidacy of Soares Carneiro for the presidency of the republic.

Table V

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Vote	92	93	90	91
Do not vote	4	5	8	9
Do not know	4	2	—	—
Do not respond	—	—	2	—

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Vote for:				
Ramalho Eanes	36	41	19	51
Soares Carneiro	26	8	17	8
Costa Gomes	2	14	2	3
Galvao de Melo	4	--	--	--
Otelo S. de C.	4	8	--	--
Pires Veloso	3	--	12	5
Do not say	25	29	50	33

Technical Data for the Poll

Poll: Portuguese over 18 years of age, residing in the districts of Braganca, Setubal, Faro and Lisbon.

Sample: 100 interviews in each district.

Criterion for selecting the field of action for the study: One district having predominantly AD influence (Braganca, AD 61 percent); one district having predominantly Socialist Party (PS) influence (Faro, PS 34 percent); one district having predominantly APU influence (Setubal, APU 47 percent); and one district with the most equitable division of votes (Lisbon, AD 40 percent; PS 26 percent; and APU 26 percent).

The four districts represent 32 percent of the total number of voters.

Questionnaire: Questions furnished by EXPRESSO.

Interviews: Direct, personal, through structured questionnaires, in the homes of the interviewees.

Selection: Random, through the random route method for selection of the home and the Kish method for selection of the individual interviewed.

Points of the sample: 26 localities selected at random after a prior stratification by district and "habitat."

Field Work: 12 to 14 June 1980.

Maximum margin of error overall: plus 5 percent in an interval of reliability to 95 percent and p equals 50 percent.

Maximum margin of error at the district level: plus 10 percent in an interval of reliability to 95 percent and p equals 50 percent.

Institute responsible for the poll: Norma, Portuguese member of Gallup International.

The analysis of the results is made by EXPRESSO.

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CSO: 3101

EANES RATING ON POLL STABLE, AD DECREASES SLIGHTLY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 5 Jul 80 p 7

[Text] Technical Format

Universe: Portuguese over 18 years of age, residing in the districts of Viseu, Beja, Porto and Lisbon.

Sample: 100 interviews in each district

Criterion for Selection of the Area of the Study: One district with a predominantly AD [Democratic Alliance] influence (Viseu: 64 percent AD); one district with a predominantly PS [Socialist Party] influence (Porto: 35 percent PS); one district with a predominantly APU [United People's Alliance] influence (Beja: 51 percent APU); and one district with a more equitable distribution of votes (Lisbon: 40 percent AD, 26 percent PS and 26 percent APU). The four districts account for 46 percent of the total voters.

Questionnaire: Questions supplied by EXPRESSO.

Interviews: Direct, personal, through a structured questionnaire, at the residence of those interviewed.

Selection: Random, using the "random route method" for the selection of the household, and the "Kish method" for the selection of the individual interviewed.

Sample points: 26 localities, selected at random, after a prior stratification according to district and habitat.

Field work: 27-29 June 1980.

Maximum Margin of Error for the Total: + or - 5 percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent, and p = 50 percent.

Maximum Margin of Error for the District: + or - 10 percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent, and p = 50 percent.

Institution Responsible for the Research: NORMA, Portuguese member of Gallup International.

The analysis of the results was made by EXPRESSO.

A quick analysis of the results of the tenth and final exclusive EXPRESSO/ NORMA opinion poll taken this time in Lisbon, Porto, Viseu and Beja, from 27 to 29 June, warrants drawing the following conclusions:

The results concerning the way in which Gen Ramalho Eanes is performing as president of the republic improved since the last poll (48 percent approving and 22 percent disapproving 2 weeks ago, as compared with 46 percent approving and 16 percent disapproving in this poll).

In Porto, a month and a half ago, the percentages were 47 approving and 9 disapproving. The difference declined slightly in this poll. In Viseu, Eanes' rating rose, although at the cost of undecided individuals (43 percent versus 28 percent a month and a half ago, and 33 versus 13 percent now). In Beja, there was a decline (33 versus 14 percent) in the seventh poll, with ratings of 55 versus 7 percent now.

Generally speaking, his percentages remain high, and exceed those of Sa Carneiro.

Insofar as the prime minister, Francisco de Sa Carneiro is concerned, his rating was lower in all districts except for Beja.

There was a substantial decline in Lisbon (41 percent approving versus 33 percent disapproving 2 weeks ago, and 25 percent approving versus 34 percent disapproving now).

Although the results are still positive, Sa Carneiro's rating also dropped in Porto and Viseu, in comparison with the seventh poll (in Porto, 39 versus 18 percent then, and 40 versus 30 percent in the same district now; and in Viseu, 45 versus 25 percent a month and a half ago, and 34 versus 18 percent there now).

In Beja, Sa Carneiro's rating rose slightly (a month and a half ago, he received ratings of 26 versus 60 percent, and they are now 27 versus 41 percent).

A new question involved finding out whether, in the forthcoming elections for the Assembly of the Republic, the majority of the Portuguese people would vote for the same party or alliance for which they voted in December, whether they would vote for another alliance or party, or whether they would not vote; and, in the event that there was a change of vote, whether that change would be toward the left or right.

Change to the Left

Generally speaking, there was a rather high percentage of opinion that the Portuguese people would change their vote, voting more for the left, especially in Porto and Beja (4 and 23 percent, respectively).

Whether or not indicative of another, the percentage of those who think that there will be a change in vote is higher than that of those who feel that such a change will not take place.

The fourth question relates to the forthcoming legislative elections.

In general, the percentage of those intending to vote is still quite high.

AD is ahead in Lisbon, Porto and Viseu, and AFU is ahead in Beja.

However, AD itself declined sharply in Lisbon (37.4% 2 weeks ago vs 29 percent now), and Viseu (39 percent a month and a half ago, and 31 percent now). It remains stable in Beja, and received a considerably higher percentage in Porto (where it rose from 21 percent a month and a half ago to 37 percent now).

The Socialist Republican Front (FRS) declined slightly in Porto (from 2) to 23 percent), but gained in the other three districts (by 7 points in Viseu, 7 points in Beja and 8 points in Lisbon).

As a result, the FRS is close to the AD in Lisbon and Viseu. It so happens that the poll was taken before the former was publicly launched. AFU retained its standing in Lisbon, declined 1 points in Viseu and 10 points in Beja, and gained 9 points in Porto. UDP (Popular Democratic Union) declined 1 point in Lisbon, gained 1 point in Porto, declined in Viseu and gained 2 points in Beja.

Ramos Eanes Ahead

As for the presidential elections, Costa Gomes was eliminated from the group of potential candidates and, as a possible result of this, Ramalho Eanes' rating rose 8 percent in Lisbon as compared with his rating 2 weeks ago; it rose 12 percent in Porto as compared with a month and a half ago, and it rose 3 percent in Beja, also during the same period of time.

The rating of Mario Soares, who meanwhile launched his candidacy, dropped 23 percent in Lisbon within 2 weeks. In the other three districts, and in comparison with a poll taken a month and a half ago, Mario Soares' rating rose 9 percent in Porto and 1 percent in Viseu, and dropped 2 percent in Beja.

The rating of Salgueiro de Melo dropped 4 percent in Lisbon, remained 0 in Porto and Beja, and declined 14 percent in Viseu.

[illegible] 2 percent in Lisbon, remained at 1% also in Porto, and declined 2 percent in Viseu and 1 percent in Beja.

First Walras's taking time 7 percent in Lisbon and 5 percent in Porto, and declined 4 percent in Viseu and 2 percent in Beja.

University academic [illegible] (a female breadth) for blood of heaven [illegible].

Table 1 [illegible]

	Lisbon	Porto	Viseu	Beja
Approve	69	52	51	55
Disapprove	16	31	13	7
Don't know	13	14	34	35
No answer	3	4	1	3

Table 11 [Be Careful]

	Lisbon	Porto	Viseu	Beja
Approve	33	40	34	27
Disapprove	54	55	18	41
Don't know	37	24	48	31
No answer	4	7	0	1

Table III

	Lisbon	Porto	Viseu	Beja
Will vote for the same	41	36	22	26
Will vote for another	15	17	11	16
Will not vote	3	2	2	1
Don't know	37	39	61	47
No answer	2	7	1	3
Will vote for another:				
More to the right	2	2	0	3
More to the left	13	14	9	23
No answer	1	1	2	0

Table IV

	[illegible]	Porto	Viseu	Beja
Voting	833	785	837	855
Not voting	13	12	12	14
Don't know	4	4	3	0
No answer	0	6	2	1
AD	29	30	31	13
APU	13	14	4	47
Forum for Progress (PS/CDS/ASDI)	37	43	17	19
CDP	2	3	0	2
Others	0	0	0	0
No comment	29	10	50	24

Table V

	Lisbon	Porto	Viseu	Beja
Urbina	847	773	833	858
Not voting	12	12	12	14
Don't know	4	4	3	0
No answer	0	7	2	1
Ramalho Eanes	44	50	40	60
Soares Carneiro	14	20	7	3
Galvão de Melo	0	0	1	0
Otelo Saraiva Carvalho	2	3	3	6
Vitor Veloso	4	6	0	0
No comment	36	21	47	31

2029
(580; 310)

SERVICE CHIEFS ON FUTURE OF ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE

Army Chief Outlines Mission

Madrid YA in Spanish 31 May 80 pp 3, 5, 6

[Interview with Ground Forces Chief of Staff Lt Gen Jose Gabeiras Montero: "Army--Main Component Responsible for National Defense"]

[Text] The Army is perfectly familiar with the missions assigned to it, to wit: "Maintain the unity of Spain, respect for its symbols, and observation of the constitution." Nation must have modern army. Lt Gen Jose Gabeiras Montero has been chief of staff of the Army for a little more than a year. The Cabinet appointed him chief of staff of the Army on 18 May 1979, at the same time promoting him to the rank of lieutenant general. Son and grandson of Navy officers, he was born in El Ferrol in 1916; he entered the Artillery Academy at Segovia at the age of 18, starting a long and brilliant career. Here are his comments for this special issue on the Armed Forces.

[Question] What is the program which is being carried out during this new military phase which coincides with your tenure as chief of staff of the Army?

[Answer] As always, the Army during this new phase must be the main component responsible for the defense of national territory against any type of aggression and it must do so in conjunction with the Navy and the Air Force.

The nation must have a modern, efficient, and mobile Army in keeping with current military technology and capable of absorbing future technological developments; naturally, all of this must be accomplished within the country's economic possibilities.

What we therefore have at this time is an evolution toward a European-style army, with dimensions in proportion to the objectives assigned to

the Joint Strategic Plan. Made up of well-equipped and well-trained units, an Army which will have sufficient means of fire support, movement, intelligence, and command so as to have the power and flexibility necessary for the purpose of operating at the right time and with the proper effectiveness wherever its presence is required, taking into account the wide varieties of terrain in Spain and the mobility to be provided for the bases used by the naval and air forces.

(Question) What changes will have to be accomplished, in your opinion, to achieve this mission? (Are you talking about)

(Answer) The means to attain this objective will logically be a great extent depend on budget allocations and, within them, on the priorities established. A good army is always expensive; there are cheaper armies but they are not good armies.

In accordance with this, we are going to have to come up with a new organizational structure which--designed to ensure the preponderance of the functional concept covering the entire territorial jurisdiction--will permit greater operational effectiveness.

More than on the phases which successively seem to limit the content of our reorganization, I would rather touch the question in a series of tendencies which might be as follows:

Devoting much attention to the mobility and power of units, giving them a larger proportion of armored and mechanized elements;

Adding superior fire power and greater guarantees of support, with an increase in self-propelled elements and missiles and rockets;

Devoting special attention to the airmobile forces, not only in support of movement, but also for fire support, observation, liaison, etc.;

Assuring the quality of special operations units whose employment is so important in some parts of our territory and under certain situations;

Reorganizing the general reserves in order to attain greater guarantees of support and so as to permit the materialization of command action;

Within the operational organizational setup, create general headquarters and higher-echelon staffs capable of harmoniously and flexibly organizing our units;

Pay special attention to material support which will permit the effective utilization of equipment throughout the lifetime of complex weapons systems.

As far as the big blocks of forces constituting the Army are concerned--the strategic strike forces and the territorial operational defense forces

either quantity and makeup will in the future be determined with a view to coordinating the country's needs for both types of units as well as the budget allocations.

[Question] How do you view the Army's renewal from the personnel viewpoint?

[Answer] We have made much progress in our current criteria and projects concerning the development of commissioned officer careers in the Army, from the time they leave the Academy all the way to the higher-level command course. The same is true of NCOs.

In this way we tried to come up with properly regulated career prospects and advancement procedures for the Army's professional cadres in order at the same time to meet the requirements of a modern army, to offer adequate satisfaction to our personnel, without being subject to any variations of an organizational type which might materialize.

There will be an adequate relationship between age and duty assignment based on a series of aptitudes and training and selection phases and levels will be determined so as to make it possible for us to man each job with the most suitable individual and under the best psychological conditions. The branch of service assignment group (known as Group B) will be modified in terms of its current concept and will be called "active reserve."

Job assignments will be manned in this group of reserves in paramilitary organizations or organizations related to the Army (IAFAS, Social Action, Civil Defense, Military Construction Service, etc.) and, in any case, these organizations will be available to the high command for employment, something which is indispensable in case of mobilization and in those other circumstances which require such action, making maximum use of those organizations which are exceptionally well equipped; the pay will be very close to regular army pay, with 3-year tours and the possibility of transfers. They will also have the same benefits (housing, schooling, etc.) as those on active duty.

The cadres coming from the General Military Academy will be grouped in one particular increment, the active-duty increment, from which two groups will be drawn, for two selective classification rounds (prior to promotion to the rank of major and the rank of colonel): the GMO (Operational Command Group) and the GMA (Support Command Group) whose members are going to be assigned to various jobs; their careers will also be different; the last selection round will lead to general officer rank.

In keeping with our times, this kind of army will require a rejuvenation of its command cadres because we need ever greater dedication and effort with each passing day if we want society to derive benefit from our existence within it; this means that we must limit our personal aspirations, place limits upon honorable ambition, be more conforming in our judgments, have full confidence in the command--something which I am ready to demand

[illegible] all we must do is to be more effective and to serve Spain, our fatherland, better.

Role of Special Forces

[Question] What is the role to be played by the Special Forces?

[Answer] We must begin by concentrating on what we, the military, consider to be special forces.

The Armed Army then are the specialized mountain troops, with their ski units and mountain-climbing units; here you have the so-called Regulars, the Legion, the Paratroopers, the Special Operations Companies, etc.

All of them, absolutely all of them, are necessary but since I assume that your question is aimed at the legionnaire troops, I will tell you that it is much easier to talk about something one does not know anything about than it is much more difficult to talk about the Legion, which is a force in being. Armies have special units which save us the trouble of having to assign draftees to certain types of active units. The ultimate purpose in founding the Legion is to contribute to reducing the draftee contingents whatever necessary, as other nations are doing with their Special Forces.

[Question] Projects involving cultural action and housing.

[Answer] The Armed Forces are doing whatever they can as part of a considerable effort to take care of the social and cultural needs of their cadres through the promotion and maintenance of installations of all kinds.

We are signing cultural cooperation agreements with the Ministry of Culture and library cooperation agreements for the creation and stocking of libraries in military units; and we are speeding up adaptation and management projects as much as possible in order promptly to launch the construction of homes for general officers, officers, and NCOs. We are also trying as soon as possible to increase the number of schools, as well as university student dormitories and other preschool facilities which are currently insufficient and which constitute grounds for constant concern. For these purposes, we have appointed a commission which is responsible for cooperating with the Student Orientation and Promotion Institute in order to work out possible assistance programs of an economic nature.

Another constant concern of ours has to do with the housing problem and here we are really working hard. A few days ago, we were given authorization to build 1,500 military housing units in the same zone (Madrid), as well as in other cities, and we are also trying to promote military housing cooperatives.

Very shortly we will also start construction of 2,000 housing units for NCOs in accordance with an agreement worked out with the Ministry of Public

Works and Urban Development as well as the National Housing Institute. We are also setting up the Military Homes Sponsorship Foundation in order to make the entire effort more flexible and more dynamic.

We are likewise aware of the need for having logistic residences available (clearly differentiated from recreational residences) [illegible], basing their exclusive or almost exclusive use on the requirements of active-duty personnel who must frequently travel and change residence; in this sense, we are actively working to improve the existing facilities and we are trying to build new ones or remodel old ones.

[Question] How would you like the Army to be viewed by the country and what are its aspirations?

[Answer] Today's Army--which is the Army of yesterday and of always--is perfectly familiar with its missions and only seeks to sustain and defend its prestige, to inspire the nation's love, loyalty to the King, subordination to the government, love of the people from whom it springs, and deterrence of its possible enemies. It has no partisan martyrs--because its fallen comrades died for the fatherland to which we are devoted--nor does it have any politics; but it does carry a specific democratic weight which I want to stress quite publicly since we constantly give evidence of that in terms of our eminently social aspect.

The good organization and power of armies constitute the basis of the growth of nations, as the history of humanity has shown us so often. We military men only want the Armed Forces to be updated, we want the immediate solution of organizational, functional, and economic problems, in order to prepare for the firm foundation of military potential without which we cannot have any national defense, nor any consistent foreign policy.

We are an Army that knows who it is because we belong to an old people irremediably rooted in Western culture. Our tattered and vehement history, our economic situation, our territorial size, our population density and our resources cry out for Armed Forces whose regular personnel will be a complete guarantee for domestic peace and foreign respect.

We are also a strong institution, as we can see from the words of the King during the last Military Easter Parade and as such we are the shield of our citizenry. We are aware--and we admit this quite frankly--that our only, dignified and proper way of action is confirmed within the context of strict respect for the constitution and we realize that we are not equipped to assume the very highest responsibilities which are by law reserved for the Crown.

We are perfectly familiar with the missions that have been assigned to us and we know how to accomplish them because we feel profound respect and great responsibility in assuming them: "To maintain the unity of Spain, respect for its symbols, and observation of the constitution."

His Majesty the King, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and the Spanish people can be quite sure that we will not allow anybody to exploit our noble attitude as an instrument to be employed as just anybody might wish and that we will not give anybody any grounds for identifying us with his own interests or stirring us up to engage in inopportune protagonism, below the level of our lofty missions which have become our ideals.

We have a tremendous vocation for service and because we love Spain profoundly, we love its people, even though there has been bitter epochs of misunderstanding in the past, resulting from God knows what kind of hidden devices, presenting us an element alien with respect to the rest of society of which we are definitely a party.

Navy Chief Outlines Needs

Madrid YA in Spanish 11 May 80 pp 8-10

[Interview with CNO Adm Luis Arevalo Pelluz: "The Navy Needs a Combat Task Force"]

[Text] The Spanish Navy's new nucleus will consist of one aircraft carrier and three newly-built frigates. Missiles will be installed on heavy patrol boats, on the corvettes of the "Descubierta" type and frigates of the "Baleares" type. CNO Adm Luis Arevalo Pelluz was born in Murcia in 1918. Although he has two brothers in the Navy, his family has no other military background. He joined the Navy out of a spirit of adventure, love of the sea, and the influence of his elder brother. He entered the Naval Academy on 1 September 1934; he started the war as midshipman and came out as lieutenant; he has been an admiral since 1977. Adm Arevalo Pelluz granted YA the following interview for this special issue.

[Question] The Spanish Navy has been the pioneer in the Armed Forces, in terms of modernization plans or programs. Could you tell us a little bit about the naval program in which the Navy is engaged at this time?

[Answer] Protection of national interests and support of foreign policy obligate us to have a force which will have a strategic action capability and sufficient tactical capacity to operate effectively in the maritime space which is of priority national concern, that is to say, the Atlantic, limited by the parallels of Brest and Dakar and the 30 degrees West meridian, as well as the Mediterranean, all the way to the meridian of Sicily.

Consequently, the Navy arrived at the conclusion that it had to have a combat task force consisting of one newly-built aircraft carrier and three new frigates, in addition to the frigates and destroyers now in service.

The decision to build one aircraft carrier for helicopters and VSTOL aircraft was made in view of the need for having shipboard aircraft for naval operations and because we cannot hope to have a big aircraft carrier which would permit the employment of conventional aircraft.

In addition to this aircraft carrier and the three frigates, which are included in the third phase of the naval program started in 1965, we are turning over to the Navy a series of eight corvettes of the "Descubierta" type, with the last of these vessels to be delivered in June 1982. We are also building auxiliary units for maritime surveillance of our territorial waters and our exclusive economic zone.

This construction effort is going on in Spanish shipyards, specifically those of the National Bazan Enterprise, which means that we are at the same time strengthening Spain's potential, along with providing jobs for many Spaniards, since this involves not only the shipyards as such but also the industries which support shipbuilding.

[Question] The retirement or breakup of various vessels, whose construction goes back more than 20 or 25 years, is necessary; however, many "veteran" vessels are still in service but the big problem is that the new ones are coming in very slowly. Is any thought being given to taking these very old units out of the naval inventory any time soon?

[Answer] The modern naval units which the Navy has at this time are very few in number: five frigates of the "Baleares" class and eight corvettes of the "Descubierta" class. We cannot think in terms of taking old vessels out of the inventory because otherwise there would be a disproportion in our cost-effectiveness equation.

The data for the "retirement" of the "Lepanto"-class destroyers has not yet been set although we might estimate that this might happen during the first half of this decade.

The five destroyers of the "Churruca" class have been undergoing major refitting and repair in order to extend their lifetime. These are units with a good ASW capability and artillery and we hope that they will continue in service well into the eighties.

Replacement of "Dedalo"

[Question] It may be assumed that now that we are beginning to negotiate new friendship treaties between Spain and the United States, we will also negotiate on the cession, by the United States government, of an aircraft carrier of the "Guam" class which would replace the old "Dedalo" which, as everybody knows, cannot be kept going until 1985, when the new aircraft carrier, the PA-II, will be commissioned. Are these rumors correct, Admiral?

[Answer] Negotiations on the new treaties have not yet begun. I think that the United States Navy can dispense with a vessel of the "Guam" type

in view of current circumstances; this is why it will be necessary to keep "Dedalo" in service until it is replaced by the new aircraft carrier now under construction. This is a question of profound concern to the Spanish Navy.

[Question] The construction of the new FFG frigates has suffered a serious delay as a result of the economic situation in Spain. When do you estimate that these new frigates will go into service and what destroyers will be replaced?

[Answer] There have been some delays in the construction of the new FFG frigates, although this was not due to economic conditions. We are now in the phase of material validation and combat systems programming and it is expected that they will be commissioned in 1985.

[Question] The "Baleares" series frigates and the "Descubierta"-class corvettes at this time are the key elements in the country's Navy so that, when the latter are commissioned, we will be able to strike from the list of vessels their elder sisters of the "Atrevida" series; these corvettes will then be backed up by the heavy patrol boats which, it seems, will be armed with missiles when the time comes. Our question is this: when is this installation on the heavy patrol boats planned?

[Answer] The corvettes of the "Descubierta" class did not replace those of the "Atrevida" class which, with slight modifications, are assigned to surveillance missions. They have been reclassified as oceangoing patrol boats.

We plan to install surface-to-surface missiles on the heavy patrol boats, on the "Descubierta"-class corvettes, and on the "Baleares"-type frigates. The installation dates cannot be specified at this time due to budget availabilities and delays in the manufacture of the missile under consideration.

A Program of Priorities

[Question] The minesweepers, both oceangoing and coastal, come from American aid, as well as from the nation's industry, but they are also showing their age. When will these vessels be replaced? And is it expected that they will be replaced with second-hand units from the United States Navy?

[Answer] We do not expect to get any more vessels from American aid, apart from the TA-12, which will arrive in Spain early next August. Under the Navy Force Objectives Plan, we are considering the construction of new units of widely differing types in accordance with a program based on priorities and of course to the extent that we get funding.

The minesweeper concept has changed and right now we must talk in terms of combat units to be used against mines [mine warfare units], of which none are under construction in Spanish shipyards. However, we are studying the

problem of replacing the old units, substituting some of them with modern minesweepers.

Concerning the auxiliary units, there is a construction plan and we are currently building four tugboats, two tanker barges, oil tankers, and scows for duty in port.

[Question] Regarding coastal surveillance, apart from the light patrol craft now in service, what other type of patrol boats and coast guard launches are being built in Spanish shipyards for the Navy?

[Answer] The surveillance forces, which will be completed in 1982, consist of ten maritime surveillance patrol boats with a displacement of 280 tons, the first four of which have already been launched.

In addition to the above, we have or we will shortly have the following units whose construction is being financed from funds provided by the Undersecretariat of Fishing and the Merchant Marine, although their maintenance, employment, and crews will be the responsibility of the Navy.

Four external surveillance launches, with a displacement of 85 tons, with the keel having been laid down for the first two; 20 coastal surveillance launches with a displacement of 21 tons, which have already been turned over to the Navy.

Twenty interior surveillance launches, all of which have already been delivered.

We are studying the construction of new oceangoing units for surveillance duty in the exclusive economic zone.

[Question] The submarine arm today is fundamental in any average navy. Spain's four submarines are still in service; they derive from American aid and date back to 1943 and 1944, which is why it is vitally important to replace them; that would leave us only the four "Delfin" submarines built in Spain under a French license. Can we anticipate a certain speed up in the construction of oceangoing submarines which will be called upon to replace the old and antiquated American submarines?

[Answer] We expect to relieve the submarines provided under American aid and currently in service with the units of 70 series, the "Agosta" class, which will be started at the end of 1982, at a delivery rate of one boat per year, so that we will have a complete series by the end of 1985. Their construction is not subject to any economic restrictions and no speed up, such as you suggested, is necessary here.

[Question] According to the naval program, authorization has already been given for the purchase of 12 VSTOL aircraft, to make up a total of 24, and right now studies are being conducted on the follow-on aircraft, to take over after these aircraft. Could you tell us whether we are waiting

to see the results obtained from the United States version of the VSTOL aircraft, the AV-8A, or whether the Naval Air Arm prefers the Sea Harrier or whether perhaps we are going to continue with more Harrier aircraft?

[Answer] Before the end of 1980, the Navy will receive five "Matador" (Harrier) aircraft which will complete the 8th Squadron of the Naval Air Flotilla.

We are now conducting a market survey and we are collecting information on the various types of VSTOL aircraft in order to come up with a cost-effectiveness estimate prior to any purchase of any new units. It is too early to know what the results of those studies are.

[Question] Regarding helicopters, what new equipment have you asked for and when are you going to get it?

[Answer] As far as helicopters are concerned, we are also conducting studies prior to any new purchases which would be designed to boost the ASW and warfare combat capacity of the future task force.

[Question] The Spanish Marines say that they will be the second-strongest force of its kind in Europe and it seems that the Marines have the sympathy of navies all over the world. Concerning heavy equipment, either American or Spanish, would you tell us what the Marines are going to get this year or thereafter?

[Answer] They are going to get 155 [-millimeter] howitzers, AT missiles, Pegaso armored cars for the defense and security forces, as well as domestically produced light and heavy amphibious vehicles.

[Question] Attack transports and landing craft are the fundamental vehicles for landing this Marine infantry. On 17 January, the United States Navy turned over to the Spanish Navy a new attack transport which will be numbered TA-11. In view of this number, does this mean that this attack transport will replace the TA-11 "Aragon?" Do we expect the arrival of new transports or landing vessels from American aid? Are we building or are we going to build, in Spain, some landing craft or boats or smaller units?

[Answer] As a matter of fact, the TA-13 (ex-"Paul Revere") replaces "Castilla" not "Aragon." The latter will be replaced by the TA-11 (ex-"Francis Marion") which will be turned over to the Navy on 11 July of this year at Norfolk; it is scheduled to arrive in Spain, as I said before, during the last days of August.

We are planning to build landing units for our amphibious force in Spain and we are now in the planning phase although we are still struggling with the shortage of funds.

Armament

[Question] Let us conclude this interview with armaments, the key element in any warship. Concerning conventional artillery, Spain's modern vessels are armed with guns from different countries. Does it look as if the Meroka, which is entirely Spanish-made, will now be used in the Navy?

[Answer] Studies aimed at the drafting of naval programs which the Navy proposes to carry out involve different types of vessels which are being analyzed carefully. Each mission must be matched with a certain type of vessel and the latter must have armament in keeping with its mission.

I want to confirm to you that the Navy is indeed going to install the multibarrel Meroka weapon on various vessels although, since this system is fundamentally for (close-in) "point defense," against surface-to-surface missiles, we will install it only on those vessels which may constitute a reasonable target for such missiles by virtue of their size and nature.

[Question] Are depth charges, mines, and torpedoes to be used against surface targets or ASW torpedoes produced domestically? How well-equipped in this respect?

[Answer] All of our currently available depth charges are of foreign origin, although they have been improved by connecting them with some devices of domestic design and manufacture.

The nation's industry is now testing a new type to be launched from any surface vessel, helicopter, or aircraft; the Navy is cooperating in these tests and the decision as to the adoption of the particular type will depend on the result of the tests.

It is nevertheless significant to note that the depth charge, which must be launched in the proximity of the submarine, is due to disappear in view of the appearance of other arms which will replace it, with the advantage that the new arms can be launched from a greater distance.

This is why the depth charges we now have are considered sufficient.

The mines which we have (some of which are quite old) are of varying origins and some of them of course are made in Spain. Right now, the nation's industry is manufacturing a certain number of mines with characteristics superior to those we already have; they can be used in defensive or offensive minefields, from surface vessels, from submarines, or from aircraft.

It is very difficult categorically to answer whether we are well provided with mines because their quantity depends on employment requirements and economic possibilities.

[illegible] we have are considered sufficient if we keep in mind that technological evolution in this field is very fast and that we [illegible] modern equipment on hand.

[illegible] we have ASW robot helicopters of the Aerospatiale Alouette III type.

[illegible] ASW is a system which carries a torpedo and enables us to make immediate attacks against submarines located at some distance and we do have this type of weapon on board our vessels.

The Bofors system launches depth charges, by means of rocket propulsion, over a shorter range than Asroc. They are made entirely by our domestic industry and we are mounting some of them on our units.

[Question] Finally, regarding missiles, both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface, our navy recently included among their most sophisticated weapons the Exocet-Standard AM missiles of American origin and the Sea-Sparrow and Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles. Could you briefly tell us something about those missiles and the new prospects on that score as far as future years are concerned?

[Answer] As far as the missiles you mentioned are concerned, I can tell you that our vessels have or will have them in the near future. Their features can be found in any specialized magazine.

Air Force Provides Deterrence

[Madrid YA in Spanish 11 May 80 pp 11, 12]

[Interview with Air Force Chief of Staff Lt Gen Emiliano Jose Alfaro Arregui: "The Air Force--An Essential Factor in Deterrence"]

> [Text] The OMUDA [Air Force Organization] Program has the objective of developing and completing the organizational structure of the Air Force. Combat 11 will improve and support the Semiautomatic Air Defense System and will place civil air traffic control on a semi-automatic basis. The General Staff at this moment is studying the replacement of the Phantoms. The C-101 will be used in the basic phase by all pilots. Teaching assignments predominate among the long service record of Air Force Chief of Staff Lt Gen Emiliano Jose Alfaro Arregui. He was in charge of the training of numerous career officers who today are members of the most modern component of the Armed Forces, the Air Force. The lieutenant general was born in Burgos in 1918 and his military career began with the Civil War when he volunteered; it reached its high point in 1978 when he was appointed to the

affairs he holds now. We discussed the role of the country's Air Force with him.

[Question] The Air Force is the military instrument of air power and an essential factor in deterrence. This is the organizational definition of this component which is now being reorganized in order to put together a systematic organizational structure for the future. This reorganization process has been called the OMAER Program. Could you tell us something about this program and its current status?

[Answer] The Air Force is indeed the military instrument of air power and an essential factor in deterrence. Its updating and constant perfection are a fundamental concern and, with this in mind, the OMAER Program, launched in January 1978, has the objective of developing and completing the organizational structure of the Air Force in a progressive and systematic manner.

Its first phase, which has been completed, was aimed at reorganizing all Air Force organizations on the political-military and management levels.

The second phase, which is practically completed, calls for the reorganization of the Air Force organizations on the organic execution level, that is to say, the air units on earth; it is expressed by the reorganization of these units and the study and determination of their organizational charts.

In this sense, and as a part of the reorganization process for the above-mentioned air units, a ministerial order has recently been approved, along with the general instructions pertaining to it, treating the economic-administrative sections of the units.

Finally we have drafted a general directive spelling out the organizational structure and functions of the air units, in the hope that the determination of their organizational charts will be completed shortly, which will mark the completion of the above-mentioned second phase of the OMAER Program.

[Question] Another key program in this profound reorganization effort is called PEGEA. Can you explain the general outlines of that program to us?

[Answer] The Air Force in reality began its reorganization years ago and, as far as personnel is concerned, the Aviation Arm Reorganization Law was passed already in 1974; its implementation has led to an effective rejuvenation of the operational commands.

As far as the PEGEA Program is concerned, its study was begun in August 1978 and its development has advanced sufficiently to give us a general and overall scheme prior to the creation of the CIPER [Interservice

Personnel Commission). This advance in our work permitted a very positive contribution to the commission's work when the Army submitted the studies which gave rise to bills for the "creation of the active reserve," which covered the three services as well as the "command classification and promotion system" and "basic NCO scale and special scales" bills.

Right now, the Air Force has its own draft, for subsequent study by the CIFER, concerning the Law on Command Classification and Promotion System in the Air Force. As far as the Law for NCOs and Special Skills is concerned (whose study was assigned first priority), a draft has already been approved and has been checked out with the personnel involved so that the latter may make their suggestions regarding the bill as such. A commission, made up of 20 members from the various groups--special officer and NCO groups--was formed for this purpose; it has come up with a series of suggestions for the bill. Right now, we are gathering all of these suggestions in a document in order to study the final version of the draft of the bill that will be forwarded to the CIFER.

The CIFER is currently studying a joint decree draft covering the Army, Navy, and Air Force, dealing with the regulation of the supplementary rosters for the three services.

Another document of enormous interest to the Air Force--which is in a very advanced study stage--is the Air Force Classification Manual. The purpose here is to spell out each of the duty assignments, with the requirements for operational purposes, and, by virtue of them, to come up with a functional classification of all Air Force personnel in order to adjust their job titles and experience to each of these duty assignments.

[Question] The construction and set up of the semi-automatic air defense system, called Combat Grande, was completed in September 1977. The first phase of the updating of our alert and control network has also been completed. What does Combat Grande II--which is currently underway--consist of?

[Answer] The defense of Spanish air space is one of the fundamental missions of the Air Force. To accomplish that mission, we must have continuous, precise and updated information. Preparing the systems necessary for providing that information is the function of the Combat Grande Program.

The establishment of SADA (Semi-Automatic Air Defense System) was the result of the first part of this program. Now, the Combat Grande II Program has the objective of improving and supporting the SADA system and placing civil air traffic control on a semi-automatic basis.

Among other things, it essentially involves the establishment of the MADAC system for placing air traffic control on a semi-automatic basis, the installation of radar in the Northwest, in the Barbanza Mountain Range,

to expand the coverage of the Air Defense System and to increase the interception capacity of the Air Defense System, along with the interconnection of the system with the ground-to-air missiles of the Army and the improvement of the Air Force's microwave network.

This program was begun in 1978 and it is hoped that it will be completed by March 1982.

Replacing the Phantoms

[Question] How are you going to handle the replacement of the F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber-interceptors with the Casa-Northrop fighter-bombers?

[Answer] Right now, we are relieving one generation of combat aircraft with another. Aircraft, such as the Phantom, have been in service for more than 20 years and are going to cause losses and are going to be replaced with other, more advanced aircraft. We can say that all of the world's air forces--at least in the Western world--are simultaneously facing the problem of picking a new combat aircraft.

The FACA (Future Combat and Attack Aircraft) Program--which is designed to resolve this problem for the Spanish Air Force--has been widely disseminated in the press and I believe that the public is fully informed on it. On the one hand, the Air Force General Staff is conducting comparative cost-effectiveness studies on the weapons system throughout its entire lifetime. On the other hand, an interministerial commission and the Directorate-General of Armaments and Materiel is analyzing the industrial and economic counterparts which would best compensate Spain regarding the possible contract form.

It has been announced that the number of aircraft to be purchased is 144 and that their delivery is programmed to be spread out between 1986 and 1988.

[Question] What about medium transport aircraft?

[Answer] The FATAM (Future Medium Transport Aircraft) Program is studying the purchase of a medium air transport aircraft to replace the T-7 (Azor) and the T-9 (Caribou), currently in service; but this program does not have the urgency of the preceding one, the FACA Program, in view of the current availability of air transport equipment in the Air Force as a result of recent purchases of C-130 and Casa-212 aircraft.

This makes it possible for the FATAM Program study to be carried out with a broad time margin so that all possible solutions can be properly studied.

As far as this aircraft is concerned, speaking quite generally, it will have to be an STOL aircraft, with about 8 or 10 tons of payload and dimensions facilitating loading and unloading operations although for the moment we could not supply any further data since, as I indicated to you

earlier, the program has just been started, in view of the long time frame available for its development.

[Question] What does the PEACE SIGMA Program, which was launched in 1976, consist of?

[Answer] The PEACE SIGMA Program is concerned with developing a logistic system made up of automated and integrated equipment, capable of giving the Air Force a high degree of operational readiness at minimum cost. In the first phase, the program is confined to supply management which is a function that can give us the greatest possible operational and economic benefits in the short run. Later on we will supplement this with other aspects of logistics management, such as equipment contracting, maintenance, etc.

So far, we have defined what the system is going to do (functional description approved in July 1978), how it is going to do it (logical specifications of system, approved in July 1979), and we have started the design and development phase.

According to the updated basic plan, by the end of 1980, we will have finished the design work and the first development phase whose main product will be the manual for the system, in order then to undertake various actions in Spain (purchase of information industry equipment, personnel training, strengthening the communications network, etc.) and in the United States (programs, tests for the automated portion of the system, etc.).

The system is to be fully operational in December 1982 and during 1983 we will have advice from USAF to assure initial maintenance.

[Question] The SIAM (Intermediate Mechanized Supply System) sprang up as an integral part of the PEACE SIGMA Program. What is the status of that system's development right now?

[Answer] The SIAM was born to adapt the data files which at the time were being processed in an IBM-1401 data processing machine for what then was the new UNIVAC 90/60.

Through this system, we established a procedure for carrying out a complete interrogation of the cataloguing system of the United States and in this way we can process and update the data in the Air Force files.

It provides a series of listings on references, on stocks, requests, and it also responds to the questions put to it.

It is in reality a bridge between the management procedure we had earlier and the one we are going to have when the requirements and distribution system under the SIGMA Program is put into practice; we can say that it is fully operational although it is still being perfected as the work goes on and in keeping with the requirements that come up.

Training Aircraft

[Question] What does the commissioning of the C-101 mean with regard to training plans?

[Answer] To tell the truth, although the commissioning of the C-101 and the acquisition of the future combat aircraft do create problems in terms of flight training adaptation, this does not imply any revolution either.

The Air Force has at no time failed to review the flight training systems in force and the changes, which will derive from that, I should hope, will be minimal. Besides, the C-101 is not going to be a training aircraft for fighter pilots; it will be used as a basic trainer and it will therefore be flown by all pilots who will put about 55 flying hours in with that aircraft.

The fighter pilot specialty is taught at the Talavera School, during the Air Combat Course. In this course we are currently using the F-5 aircraft, which has also been issued to the 21st Wing of the Tactical Air Command; in the future it will be replaced by the aircraft resulting from the FACA Program. There is yet a third phase in fighter pilot training; it is carried out in the air units themselves which are the ones that can spot those pilots that have a "ready for combat" aptitude.

[Question] What will the selective training aircraft be?

[Answer] The program for the future selective aircraft and for teaching elementary pilot skills has been postponed since right now we feel that requirements in this field are met by what we have at this time, that is, the E-3-B (Buecker-131), the E-17 (Mentor), and the E-24 (Bonanza). The future selective aircraft will, when the time comes, replace the aircraft mentioned above and not the E-16 (T-6 Texan) which is a basic aircraft and which is being replaced by the E-25 (CASA-101), since the first aircraft of this type have already been turned over to the Academy.

Missiles and Rockets

[Question] What is the mission of the CEMMIS (Missile Center) of the Air Force? Could you tell us what type of missiles and rockets we have and which ones you are thinking of purchasing?

[Answer] The CEMMIS is a part of the Materiel Command and its mission is to maintain and modernize the Air Force missile control sections.

Missiles are only a part of the fighter aircraft's armament which still uses automatic weapons and rockets.

We are getting supplies from the United States and France, such as the Sidewinder, Sparrow, and Matra missiles.

As for rockets, we have made much progress in the research and manufacture of rockets of various types, without overlooking missile technology, where studies for possible domestic production are very far advanced.

[Question] In conclusion, would you like to add something to all of these questions on the future of the Air Force?

[Answer] I want to use this opportunity to thank you for your attention and to note that all of the interesting questions which you put to me cover only some parts of the vast mosaic represented by Spain's Air Force; all of them, along with many others, being done in a silent and daily routine, contribute to the accomplishment of the mission assigned to the Spanish Air Force by our Constitution and the other laws.

Armed Forces, Defense Alliances

Madrid YA in Spanish 31 May 80 pp 14, 15

[Article by Cesar Ruiz Ocana: "The Armed Forces and the Options for Spain's Defensive Alliances"]

[Text] Joining NATO? Renewal of treaty with the United States? Neutrality? Joining an exclusively European defense community? These seem to be the alternatives facing Spain, presented by its politicians or foreign politicians, on the historical horizon which we contemplate as we go into the decade of the eighties.

The real situation in the field of international defensive alliances is much more unencumbered. In 1980, Spain and the United States are maintaining a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1976, due to expire within a year, in 1981. Spain also maintains agreements--directly or indirectly, of a defensive type--with other countries, such as France (1970) involving military and industrial cooperation; with Portugal (1977), involving a general accord so far not specifically spelled out; and with the FRG, where we have a Mixed Military Commission (created in 1978).

These defensive relationships involve four countries that are members of NATO.

Current Military Cooperation

The Spanish Armed Forces have been getting military equipment from the United States since the agreements signed in 1953. In 1970 they began to acquire equipment from France or to manufacture it on the basis of French licenses. For several years now, the Portuguese Armed Forces are partly being supplied with Spanish defensive equipment. Spain and the FRG are now negotiating on something which Spanish domestic political conditions frustrated in 1970--military cooperation including mainly industrial cooperation.

As in the case of the United States Armed Forces, although on a much smaller scale, the Spanish Armed Forces are organizing and developing joint military maneuvers--primarily air-naval or naval but also ground--with the French and Portuguese armed forces and, although on a smaller scale and with less frequency, with the Italian, Belgian, and other NATO navies.

The current operational organization of the Spanish Army, with its strategic strike forces and its territorial operational defense forces, for example, is very similar to the organization in effect until a few years ago in the French Army. The theoretical organizational chart of its infantry battalions (three standard companies and one mechanized company) is similar to that the Italian Army. The French Army has now equalized most of its major operational units in terms of territorial operations and the reorganization now in progress within the Spanish Army seems to pursue the same goals.

As far as military equipment is concerned, sources have been diversified since 1953 and so have the means for obtaining them. The procurement of United States surplus equipment (Sabre, Texan, Dakota aircraft, etc.; Guppy submarines, "Dedalo" helicopter carrier, Fletcher destroyers, etc.; M-41, M-47, M-48 tanks, tactical vehicles, jeeps, etc.) has been followed by the production, in Spain, of United States vessels (The SCS aircraft carriers, including the purchase of the blueprints, the FFG frigates) as well as combat aircraft (Northrop F-5).

Diversification toward Europe

But the procurement of equipment or the acquisition of patents have also been diversified. This industrial nationalization and international cooperation policy began with the Armed Forces Modernization Law of 1965. Spain tried to obtain patents on British vessels (following the tradition of the Spanish Navy) as well as patents on German tanks, the Leopard tanks, armed with the British 105-millimeter gun. The opposition of the Labour government, for political reasons, forced us to initiate this new diversification phase on the United States market (the DEG frigates) and on the French (Daphne submarines and AMX-30 tanks).

Today, as part of their programs which are subordinated to the combined-force objective, pending final approval, the Spanish Armed Forces are supplied through an autochthonous defense industry in everything which that industry can supply (light armament, cross-country and armored vehicles, warships--except regarding electronic systems--and transports as well light tactical support aircraft). An example of this are the deliveries of the light Cetme L assault rifle, the Ecia mortars, the BMR-600 armored vehicles, the Pegaso cross-country trucks, the "Descubierta" corvettes, and the light frigates inspired by them, the Aviojet trainer and the Aviocar light transport.

Technologically and economically speaking, regarding what the domestic industry cannot supply, international cooperation channels have been opened

up (always with members of NATO, such as the United States, France, West Germany, Italy, etc.), such as in the production of AMX-30 tanks and perhaps the Leopard II, the Agosta submarines, the SCS aircraft carrier, the FFG frigates, the SA-365 helicopters, and, as a part of a joint production setup, combat aircraft such as the present-day French Mirage-F1 and possibly, by the middle of this decade, the McDonnell Douglas F-18A, the Northrop F-18L, or the General Dynamics F-16.

Something similar could be said about tactical missile systems, such as the joint French-German Milan AT rockets; the likewise French-German Roland AA missiles; the British systems, such as the Rapier and the Blowpipe or Italian systems, such as the Albatross. Based on cooperation or on purchase in their countries of origin, we must, in addition to the foregoing French-German Milan systems, also mention the Tow, Sea Sparrow, and Harpoon of the United States, the Exocet and Super Magic of France, etc.

Mutual Interests

Spain is of interest to the United States and NATO because of its enviable strategic location astride the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, between Europe and Africa, between Europe and America. This is Spain, as a part of the Iberian Peninsula, along with Portugal and the respective island groups of the Iberian States, that is, the Canary Islands, Madeira, the Azores, and Balearic Islands. The first three of these constitute a surveillance platform over the petroleum route leading to Western Europe and the United States, off the Atlantic shore of the "vast strategic vacuum" represented by the Sahara. Here we also have a link with a possible South Atlantic Treaty, with Brazil, Argentina, and perhaps the South African Union. The Iberian Peninsula also looks toward Europe as the strategic and logistic rear guard of European NATO. It is furthermore a refuge for a withdrawal behind the Rhine or a bridgehead "like Normandy."

But this great strategic and geopolitical value of Spain will count for little or will mean nothing at all to Spain herself if it has no national content. In other words, if within the range of its possibilities, all of its possibilities, it provides itself with a national content featuring modern, well-organized, and well-equipped armed forces in the image of and resembling those of its potential European allies which are on a similar development level. This of course implies a budget fund allocation among Spain's Army, Navy, and Air Force which must be more equitable than what we have now. This is so because it seems that the Spanish contribution to the European alliance--either by joining NATO or through bilateral treaties with some of its members--is geared more toward air and naval requirements rather than land requirements.

Neutrality--just like autarchy in economic terms--is getting more and more utopian with each passing day. If some countries maintain this autarchy, this is due to the fact that they do not have the strategic position which Spain holds--for better or worse--against the background of the ambitions of the big international blocs which are involved in dispute. But our "alliance" or our alliances, today and for the decade of the eighties, must and will be alliances and not colonization. We contribute to the defense of others because others contribute to our own defense. And we demand that the risky defensive alliance, the defensive setup, correspond to the proper political and economic setup.

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'TERCUMAN' BLAMES ECEVIT, MASS'S ERBAKAN

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Jun 80 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text] The NAP (Nationalist Action Party) and the NSP (National Salvation Party) are Turkey's third and fourth most politically powerful parties. At present no one can justify with figures which one is in third place.

Ecevit's greatest desire is to shut down and abolish the NAP, "to eradicate the party at its roots." This desire, however, stems from his ignorance of history. It is because he does not know history that he thinks the NAP can be shut down. He believes that if--as were sweet loaves given the Janissaries, demanding them from the sultan in front of the Imperial Gate--the NAP were held out and tossed before him, the matter would end there... Just like the theorists who supported the "Unity of the Elements." He never considers that the NAP was established by dissatisfied Turkish nationalists, that their roots descend into the depths of Ottoman history, and that even were there no party behind the NAP, the Turkish nationalists has always existed and will continue to exist henceforth. Clearly, in essence he thinks that were he successful in destroying the NAP as if it were an envelope, then, he could do away with the envelope's entire contents through a vigorous attack beyond that undertaken against Turkish nationalists during his 22 months in power. He does not realize that the NAP could be established ten times and abolished ten times, but the man who would eradicate the roots of the Turkish nationalism which produced the Turkish Republic from the Ottoman Empire has yet to be born... He does not realize that even when there was no NAP there were Turkish nationalists. He also is unaware that Turkish nationalism is not confined to those within the NAP envelope.

Ecevit now wants help from the NSP in destroying the NAP. NSP members ought to make a careful comparison between themselves and the NAP and analyze meticulously whether they were resemble the RPP (Republican Peoples Party) or the NAP. They ought to examine the "identicalities" and not the differences. On the day they can produce such a register, they will stand shocked at their party's past record. No one saw the Janissaries, demanding their sweet loaves before the Imperial Gate, take just one thirty steps

[illegible] at their [illegible] record. [illegible] and the [illegible], demanding their [illegible] before the Imperial Gate, were just one thrown down from above and deposited. Rather, every [illegible] provided became cause and basis of the demand for "a second and successive [illegible]."

An [illegible] effort to [illegible] the NAP will prove a suicidal move. If there are NSP members who hope to take advantage of the NAP's abolition, they should consider well that those many charges and accusations directed at the NAP today will be leveled at them tomorrow. If in this nation the NAP's "[illegible]" would be given to Ecevit, the NSP's "[illegible]" also would be given. If there are NSP members who have followed with a smile the accusations Ecevit has leveled at the NAP--accusations he has repeated every single day for years with the words, "They are leaving a trail, they are doing great harm," they should henceforth consider the sorts of things being penned with huge letters on the very first page of a file whose cover will be opened when the right moment presents itself to the RPP.

If this country has a Constitution and a code of law and if these two parties are "legal and legitimate" bodies within the framework of that Constitution and law, then should one of "the two inalienable elements of free, democratic government" forge the "other" with a few false accountings, "that element" must recognize above all else that it has cleared the way for its own [illegible] tomorrow or the day after. If matters deviate from a true course and head in this direction, then this nation will never enjoy tranquility.... Should Erbakan remain unable to make a historical analysis that is realistic and insightful as to why the NAP garnered a million votes and why the NSP garnered just as many from the "same clay" and, moreover, if he should venture to make the NAP Ecevit's undue gift, let there be no doubt that Erbakan will have authored, at the least, severe pain and affliction for those NSP members who now carry him on their shoulders. The name of the person they confront is "Ecevit." And Erbakan certainly knows the extent of this man's ambitions as well as from where those ambitions come and where they are bound.

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'HURRIYET' EVALUATES POLITICAL MALAISE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Jun 80 p 10

[Column "On the Trail of Events" by Ismail Cem: "Politics That Cannot Generate Solutions"]

[Text] It is clear what point Turkey has reached in the spring of 1980. If one leaves aside the sterile debate about whether pressing needs are met on a day-to-day basis, one sees an extremely worrisome picture as far as Turkey's future is concerned.

Economic growth is at a standstill. Efforts for development in the past 30 years have naturally brought Turkey to a more advanced stage, but this stage has not been able to go beyond an extremely sensitive economic structure; it has not been able to break the bonds of overdependence on foreign loans. The rise in petroleum prices has been sufficient to throw everything into confusion. The economic machinery is able to function only by virtue of large loans secured from abroad, loans which are very difficult to find and whose continuance is unassured.

Within this economic framework it is evident that inequalities are growing and living conditions are deteriorating. Every year hundreds of thousands of people find it impossible to accommodate themselves in the agricultural sector and move to the big cities. Unfortunately, what they find in cities is not an opportunity for employment or semi-employment as in the old days, but for the most part pure and simple unemployment, which has reached record levels. As for wages and salaries, in terms of purchasing power they remain below what they were 7 years ago.

In a country such as this terror has become a "way of life"; the society has learned to live with it. Outside police and legal measures, society has been virtually incapable of devising any method to resolve the phenomenon of terror. In this environment, many institutions have entered a process of degernation; they have not performed their functions. The wheels of the social machinery have become worn out; evasion of duty, apathy and irresponsibility have become the rule--so much that the society is losing its sensitivity to react against the confusion in large cities, the murders,

the unions scandal, the pervading cut of public property and the state of lethargy. People have begun to "accept" this intractability and this confusion; they have started to believe there can be no other way and that nothing can be improved. Under the influence of an increasingly warped and degenerate set of values, people have begun to withdraw into their own little worlds, each trying to save his own skin.

Is this situation we are going through as a society a fate?

Naturally it is not. What makes it look like some kind of fate, making the situation grimmer and more intractable, is a crisis in coming up with political solutions.

Coming up with solutions to all the problems mentioned above, formulating models to tackle the difficulties, spelling out concrete methods or at least generating ideas are, in a society, functions delegated to political machineries, political organizations, parliaments and governments. Yet, evident in Turkey for some time has been the fact the country is experiencing a period of genuine "political insolubility" independent of political party positions, administrative cadres, and organizations or their natures, personal stances, or good intentions.

In other words, the institution of politics, which has assumed one of society's most important functions, is not doing its job properly. Pitted against gigantic problems it is neither generating ideas, proposals and models, nor is it originating practical solutions and putting them into use. Thus, there emerges an example of a society in which the one and only institution--namely politics--trusted with the function of determining the diseases afflicting this society and proposing its own methods of treatment seems to have resigned from its job. Attempts by marginal bureaucrats, the press, professional and university organizations to fill in this vacuum of responsibility is, naturally, not solving any problems.

The situation is truly worrisome. For example, the institution of politics has not brought a single comprehensive, broad and persistent plan to counter terror. It has left virtually all responsibility to the security forces and the judges and has itself assumed the role of a kind of a spectator. It is not politics that is coming up with solutions which involve major projects to tackle the economic bottleneck and which propose to society conscious and equitable sacrifices--not like the haphazard ones currently in practice--with predetermined objectives, duration and results. The institution of politics is increasingly being reduced to an entity which produces cross-accusations and self-defense as substitutes for "ideas" and which, by deviating from its primary functions, is losing respect in society.

In a way, that political institutions are taking on these characteristics stems in large part from certain erroneous developments in the perception of politics. The primary function of political cadres is to produce "political solutions"--from their own viewpoints--for society. However, these cadres

have increasingly transformed their primary function into generating "non-political services" for a group of individual supporters (solving private problems, finding jobs, extending use of municipal and state facilities). Increasingly, propelling mechanisms in parties have begun to gage in particular this "generation of nonpolitical services." In other words, an "auxiliary service"--acceptable when kept within legal bounds--has replaced the original principal function of political cadres.

In conclusion, the fact that the institution of politics [is assuming the responsibility of performing a nonpolitical service such as "finding jobs and to an ever greater degree the role of--extending use of facilities," means that it is getting further away from its function of generating political solutions. This in turn is rendering the whole political spectrum--entrusted with the function of generating solutions for society--ineffective and dragging Turkey more swiftly into the chaos of insolubility.

No matter how much the institution of politics is criticized, it is clear that masses in particular and all democratic forces must guard this institution since this institution is essential to the existence of democracy. They must help it with their proposals and criticism.

Like all institutions, politics is healthy only to the degree that it is performing its natural function. This function, the principal one, is to bring concrete and consistent solutions from different political viewpoints to Turkey's numerous problems and to present society with these solutions.

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[illegible]

[illegible] Turkish automotive industry today reminds one of adolescents leaving childhood and taking their first steps into young adulthood.

Even so, the history of this branch of industry goes back only 20 years.

Everything was conceived and developed within 20 years. In the 1950s the issue of whether an automobile could be manufactured indigenously in Turkey was hotly debated. In the early 1960s, on the other hand, the country was beginning to accept the idea that the advantages of this industry could come not cars, trucks and buses even if they could only assemble parts.

The early 60's also witnessed more frequent contacts between Turkish industrialists and foreigners. Starting in 1963 two-door Anadol cars were operating on Turkish highways. At the time it was said of the Anadol--which then cost [illegible] Turkish liras--that "it will not run." But this creation of Turkish technology and labor ran successfully. This was followed by joint investment ventures between the OYAK [Army Mutual Aid Association] group and the French Renault and between the Koc group and the Italian Fiat. The factories were commissioned by 1970. In 1971, the Murat 131 and the Renault 12 TL were on the Turkish market at prices of 57,000 and 60,000 Turkish liras respectively.

But this change, from starting the wheels of the automotive industry quite late in the starting race for regular mass production of Turkish automobiles, saying: "Turkey may have left 10 years behind."

Only 20 years ago there were debates on "whether it is possible to manufacture an automobile in Turkey." Only foreign made vehicles used to run on our highways and in some villages in Anatolia the automobile was still [illegible]. Today, nearly 20 years later, automobiles manufactured in this country are being loaded on ships and sold to Middle Eastern

vehicles. Even Turkish-produced MAN buses made in Turkey are being sold to Germany, the homeland of MAN.

Seventeen Vehicle-Manufacturing Firms

Today there are 17 automotive firms in Turkey, all built by modern technology. Automobiles, trucks, pickups, buses, mini-buses, tow-trucks and tractors are manufactured at these factories. More than 16,000 workers toil in these factories of ours.

The average share of locally produced parts in motor vehicles manufactured in this country is 80 percent. In other words, by manufacturing, say, an automobile on our own land we are gaining 85 percent of the foreign exchange we would pay to buy it from abroad. This percent gain changes depending on the type of the vehicle. The first significant numbers in vehicle production in our country were recorded in 1971. That year a total of 46,853 automobiles were manufactured in Turkey. In the following years production was sometimes less and sometimes more than this figure. Last year close to 44,000 automobiles were manufactured.

Officials state that the domestic auto market seems to be "saturated" but that rapidly rising prices are partly responsible for this. The officials say: "In 1980 the firms will work on new projects and there will be no drop in production. Emphasis will be given to foreign markets in addition to the domestic market."

Table 1. The state of automotive production

Vehicle type	Number produced 1978	1979	1980 (first 3 months)
Trucks	12,320	11,226	2,064
Pickups	6,880	8,986	1,490
Buses	932	1,072	276
Automobiles	54,084	43,808	8,976
Mini-buses	3,153	4,230	690
Vans	545	621	136
Tow-trucks	626	433	76
Tractors	16,532	15,447	2,511
Total	95,117	85,924	16,227

Automotive officials say that last year was unfavorable but they are optimistic about the 80s.

Meanwhile, automobiles and other vehicles manufactured in Turkey as well as those imported from abroad--though the latter are few--are steadily rising in number. This increase has been accompanied by a proliferation of repair and maintenance services. Hence, an "auxiliary automotive industry"--such

would not even be mentioned in name 10 years ago--is now in the process of development. Stating that almost 600,000 Turkish workers are employed in this auxiliary industry, officials say: "The Turkish automotive industry is an industrial branch in every sense. As in other countries, it started with the assemblage process and later on began manufacturing relatively simpler parts. Now, 10 years later, a large part of the engine is manufactured in this land. Today, complete automobiles and necessary spare parts are exported to many countries, including Europe, and the names of Turkish automotive products are mentioned in world markets."



Figure 1. Number of automobiles and automobile production in our country by years

KEY: 1. Number of automobiles
2. Automobile production
3. Years
4. First 3 months

Below Capacity Production

The 17 automotive firms in Turkey have a combined production potential of 223,300 vehicles. The actual production, however, is 85,924 vehicles. In other words, the Turkish automotive industry has managed to do only a third of what it is capable of doing. Naturally, there are many reasons for this. In particular, strikes and work slowdowns organized by Maden-Is [Turkish Mine, Metal, Metal Works and Machine Industry Workers Union], an affiliate of DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions], cause frequent halts in production. Moreover, there is a widespread shortage of raw materials and semi-finished goods. Officials complain primarily about the short supply of sheet iron. They also state that they have had difficulty in finding certain spare parts. On the other hand, the industry has no problems in finding skilled workers, clerical technical or administrative personnel.

Automobile production has the largest potential in the industry: the 3 existing plants have a combined capacity of 87,000 units per year. Last

year's production, however, stood at half this figure. The next largest potential is in tractor production. Five tractor manufacturing factories in Turkey can easily turn out around 60,000 units each year. Actual production, however, has just surpassed the 13,000 mark.

Table 11. Export schedule of the Turkish automotive industry in 1979

Name of firm	Countries sold to	Type of product sold	Value (U.S. dollars)
BMC	UK, FRG	Trucks, tractors, spare parts	2,135,910
MAN	Transkei, Iraq, FRG	Spare parts, Trucks, buses	6,051,508
Otomarsan	Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan	Buses, spare parts	20,480,121
Otosan	Israel, UK	Autos, pickups	217,928
TOFAS	Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait	Autos, spare parts	3,856,878
Turk Traktor	Dubai	Tractors, spare parts	1,386,000
OYAK-Renault	France	Spare parts	41,916
TOE	UK, United States	Spare parts	49,473
UZEL	UK	Spare parts	110,796
		Total:	$34,330,530

The Export-Price Relationship

Another problem faced by those in charge of the automotive industry is the fact that the municipalities of large cities in Turkey and certain local governments keep buying buses for in-city mass transit from countries like Hungary. Officials point out that these buses cost at least 10 percent more than those made in Turkey. They also note, however, that the factor forcing the municipalities to buy from abroad stems from payment facilities. The officials state that the local firms demand payment on delivery, while the state-supported Hungarian firms grant long-term payment facilities with no down payment requirements.

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BRIEFS

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS, RESIGNATIONS, DEATHS--Former Chairman of the Turkish Confederation of Labor (Turk-Is) Halil Tunc suffered a heart attack and has been hospitalized. He is being treated at the Social Security Organization Hospital in Diskapi. Doctors report that his condition is not serious but he is being held 3 days for observation. His condition was reportedly caused by exhaustion. [Text] [Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 16 May 80 p 9] Director General of Revenues Ahmet Esen has been relieved of his duties. He has been replaced by Director General of the Retirement Fund Ahmet Sanver Dogu. Esen has been made an advisor to the Minister of Finance. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 14 May 80] Siirt Deputy Abdulkadir Kaya, who has served in the Parliament as an independent since leaving the National Salvation Part, joined the ranks of the Justice Party in a ceremony on 13 May 1980. [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 14 May 80] Turkish Confederation of Labor Chairman Ibrahim Denizcier has been elected the Deputy Chairman of the Asian Regional Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. [Text] [Ankara DOMESTIC SERVICE in Turkish 1600 GMT 29 May 80] Siirt Provincial Governor Ibrahim Sahin, who is returning to Ministry of Internal Affairs headquarters, has been replaced by Director General for Personnel Affairs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs Tevfik Basakar. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Jun 80 p 1] Agri Provincial Governor Tuncer Percinler, who is returning to Ministry of Internal Affairs headquarters, has been replaced by Headquarters Governor Enver Kazanoglu. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Jun 80 p 1] Hakkari Provincial Governor Irfan Kurucu, who is returning to Ministry of Internal Affairs headquarters, has been replaced by Ankara Provincial Governor Kaya Uyar. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Jun 80 p 1] Denizli Provincial Governor Musa Atik has been replaced by retired Governor Abdullah Asim Igneciler. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Jun 80 p 1]

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